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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of the legal system on whether or not firms obtain the 
credit they apply for. Data comprise unique information provided directly by 48,590 firms 
from 11 European countries. We look at the strength of creditor protection, the strength of 
property rights, the time taken to resolve a dispute, the dispute resolution process’s costs and 
the number of procedures the plaintiff faces using data provided by the World Bank and the 
Heritage Foundation. The results suggest that the more efficient the judicial enforcement 
system is, and the higher the creditor protection is, the lower the probability that the firms are 
partially or totally denied credit. Our results are robust to selection bias (Heckman selection) 
as well as different controls and different estimation techniques. We find that these variables 
have considerable economic impact: the probability of obtaining credit is up to 40% higher in 








The certainty of the law and the opportunity to enforce legal rights in court can affect 
banks’ lending decisions and therefore the firms’ access to credit. Banks act as delegated 
monitors (Diamond 1984) and play a key role in supporting the development of the economy 
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by investing people’s savings in reliable firms and projects. The quality of the laws and 
institutions that support banks in dealing with delinquent customers is important in order to 
ensure that banks are able to recover the loan if a borrower defaults. In countries with strong 
creditor protection and rigorous law enforcement, banks will find it easier to control borrower 
risk and recover the loan in the event of default. As a consequence, banks will be more 
willing to lend ex ante(La Porta et al. 1997), reducing the firms’ risk of being credit 
constrained. At the same time, banks will be exposed to a greater legal risk and have a lower 
probability to force repayment in countries with little creditor protection and feeble law 
enforcement (Esty and Megginson 2003). Hence, they will be reluctant to grant credit, 
thereby constraining the firms’ credit access. 
Our research builds on previous works that examine the role of a country’s legal 
system on the firms’ debt financing. Empirical evidence suggests that the level of creditor 
and property rights protection and the rigorousness of law enforcement affect debt ownership 
concentration (e.g. Esty and Megginson 2003) and the terms of the credit, such as size, 
maturity and interest rate of the loan agreement (Bae and Goyal 2009; Laeven and Majnoni 
2005; Qian and Strahan 2007). The impact of the legal system on credit access using indirect 
measures of credit access, such as the proportion of overdrawn credit lines, the share of a 
firm’s bank debt on total debt, the total supply of loans or the collateral spread, is investigated 
by Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005); Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010); and Liberti and 
Mian (2010). Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) find that longer trials increase the 
probability that firms have overdraft loans. The outcomes of Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 
(2010) show that the overall supply of credit in developing countries increases subsequent to 
changes in collateral laws and bankruptcy laws. In line with these findings, Liberti and Mian 
(2010) suggest that in countries with stronger creditor rights and better information sharing 
mechanisms collateral spreads are smaller. 
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Our paper is close in spirit to the work of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levin (2004), 
who use direct measures of credit access, that is, data on finance obstacles perceived by 
firms, to examine the relationship with a country’s legal system. The authors investigate the 
impact of the adaptability of a country’s legal system and the political independence of the 
judiciary on firms’ financing obstacles. They find that whereas cross-country variations in the 
legal system’s adaptability help to explain differences in the financing obstacles that firms 
have to face, cross-country variations in the judiciary’s independence do not contribute to 
explaining those differences. Thus, they examine specific traits of a country’s legal system, 
but do not provide a holistic picture of the relationship between the legal system and the 
firms’ ability to obtain credit. Further, the authors do not distinguish between firms that are 
financially constrained because they have problems with obtaining loans in the first place and 
firms that are financially constrained because they obtained only part of the loan they applied 
for. Our study aims to narrow this gap by: (1) examining the impact of the strength of the 
legal rules (i.e. creditor rights and property protection) and the rigorousness of the judicial 
enforcement (i.e. time required to resolve the dispute, costs and number of procedures) 
because the quality of legal rules and judicial enforcement can also vary independently 
(Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 2000) and can therefore affect credit access differently and (2) 
evaluating both firms that did not obtain any credit at all and firms that obtained credit, but 
not enough to satisfy their financial needs. 
We rely on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) dataset from 
the European Central Bank, which collects information about access to credit and the use of 
different sources of finance as well as liquidity and finance constraints directly from firms. 
We integrate it with information on the legal systems in Europe using data from the World 
Bank and the Heritage Foundation. The resulting dataset contains 48,590 complete 
observations collected between 2009 and 2012, of which 12,504 observations concern firms 
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that applied for a loan in the period. 
We test our hypothesis using logit regression and re-test our findings by applying 
Heckman selection to address potential selection bias as well as different controls and 
different estimation techniques. In addition, we investigate the economic impact of creditor 
protection and judicial enforcement on credit access by examining the probability of 
obtaining credit in different contexts. 
The results obtained are robust and suggest that the higher the creditor protection 
(high overall strength of the legal system, high property rights protection) and the better the 
judicial enforcement system (reduced costs, reduced time, and limited number of procedures), 
the lower the probability that the firms are credit constrained. Moreover, effective creditor 
protection and judicial enforcement reduce the firms’ risk of only obtaining a proportion of 
the requested loan. Finally, we find that these variables have considerable economic impact: 
the probability of obtaining credit is up to 40% higher in countries with a more robust legal 
system. 
Our findings contribute to research and practice on several levels. They support 
earlier empirical results by suggesting a positive relationship between both the quality of 
creditor protection and the quality of the judicial enforcement system and credit access. We 
extend the knowledge of the role of legal systems in credit access by highlighting the specific 
relevance of the number of procedures to the firms’ ability to obtain credit. Thus, trials 
should not only be short and cheap, but also simple in order to enable banks to easily recover 
the loan in the event of default, and to encourage them to provide credit to firms. By 
investigating the role of both creditor rights and judicial enforcement, we develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the legal system’s traits that impact on the bank’s lending 
decision. Due to our use of unique data on the firms’ credit access, we further extend 
previous research by examining both firms that are credit constrained because they did not 
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receive any credit at all and firms that are credit constrained because they only received part 
of the loan for which they applied. On the practical level, our findings provide considerable 
insight into the competitive advantages a firm may accrue due to easier access to finance, 
when it is located in an efficient legal environment. Those findings can inform both bank 
managers and the company management regarding their decision where to locate their 
activities. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
results of previous research and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our dataset and 
the methodology and illustrates the variables used in the analysis. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Section 4 and in Section 5, we present the econometric findings on the impact of 
the legal system on the credit provided to firms, as well as a set of robustness checks. In 
Section 6, we examine the economic impact, and Section 7 discusses the implications and 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Research 
Firms tend to depend on bank debt in order to finance both their ongoing activities 
and growth. However, their ability to access bank credit is affected by the limited quantity 
and accuracy of information available (Berger and Frame 2007; Mason and Stark 2004), 
which impedes the assessment of their creditworthiness and can adversely affect access to 
credit (Moro, Fink, and Kautonen 2014; Petersen and Rajan 1994). In order to evaluate the 
risk associated with the firm, and reduce the risk of incurring future losses, banks aim to 
access additional information. However, even when the information asymmetry between the 
bank and the firm is reduced and the bank’s assessment of the creditworthiness of the 
customer is facilitated, lending to firms remains an activity that involves a risk of a customer 
defaulting on the loan. Thus, the bank has to take into consideration the extent to which 
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creditor rights are protected in determining what kind of loans and what kind of price and 
non-price terms it offers to firms, as creditor rights affect the bank’s monitoring incentives 
and re-contracting costs that can be costly when creditor rights are poorly enforced (Bae and 
Goyal 2009). 
Prior research suggests that firms benefit from a high level of creditor and property 
rights protection as well as rigorous law enforcement by accessing credit on more favourable 
terms. Qian and Strahan (2007) find that in countries with strong creditor protection, bank 
loans are associated with more concentrated ownership, longer maturities and lower interest 
rates. Bae and Goyal (2009) show that better property rights protection results in higher 
lending volumes, longer maturities and lower interest rates. The findings of both Laeven and 
Majnoni (2005) and Fabbri (2010) suggest that the quality of judicial enforcement affects 
interest rates. In addition, legal systems that bank managers perceive to be better are 
associated with a higher proportion of banks loans allocated to informationally opaque 
borrowers, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (Haselmann and Wachtel 2010), and 
a lower proportion allocated to large enterprises. 
Earlier works further suggest a positive relationship between the quality of the legal 
system and credit access. Most of these works, however, use indirect measures of credit 
access. Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) proxy credit access by investigating the 
proportion of overdraft credit lines and find that credit is less available in Italian provinces 
with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials. The results of Deakin, Demetriades, and 
James (2010), who use the ratio of private bank credit to GDP to measure credit access, 
suggest that strengthened creditor protection in India leads to an increase in bank credit. 
Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) examine the effect of legal changes on credit access by 
using the total loan supply in a country. They find that the loan supply in transition 
economies increases after changes in collateral laws and bankruptcy laws. Adrianova et al. 
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(2015) use the total loans to enterprises in Africa to investigate why banks refrain from 
lending. Their findings suggest that loan defaults impede bank lending when institutional 
quality is low. Liberti and Mian (2010) use collateral spreads to investigate how creditor 
rights and information sharing mechanisms affect credit constraints. In line with previous 
findings, their results indicate that stronger creditor rights and better information sharing 
mechanisms reduce collateral spreads and, as a consequence, improve credit access. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that employs data on the firms’ 
perception of financing obstacles in order to examine the impact of the legal system on the 
firms’ financing constraints is that by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2004). The authors 
provide evidence on the relationship between specific characteristics of a country’s legal 
system, that is, the adaptability of the legal system and judicial independence, and firms’ 
access to finance. Their results indicate that whereas cross-country variation in the 
adaptability of the legal system helps explain variations in financing obstacles, cross-country 
variation in the political independence of the judiciary does not help explain variations in 
financing obstacles. While this paper provides insight into the role of two specific traits of the 
legal system, it does not give a holistic picture of the relationship of both the quality of legal 
rules and the quality of judicial enforcement with firms’ credit access. An investigation of 
both the quality of the legal rules and of judicial enforcement is required because previous 
research suggests that their quality can very independently (La Porta et al. 1998; Pistor, 
Raiser, and Gelfer 2000) and that high-quality laws cannot substitute for weak judicial 
enforcement (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 2000). Thus, both high-quality laws (to protect the 
creditors’ rights) and rigorous law enforcement are necessary in order to stimulate external 
finance. In addition to that, the quoted research does not differenciate between firms which 
face financial obstacles because they do not obtain any credit at all, and firms facing financial 
obstacles because they only receive part of the credit they applied for. However, in both cases 
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firms will be credit constrained. 
We aim to adress this gap by using data that enables us to evaluate firms that did not 
obtain any credit at all and firms that obtained only a part of the credit they applied for. 
Further, we examine how the strength of the legal rules and the rigour of judicial enforcement 
affects firms’ ability to obtain credit. 
In the context of lending relationships, a strong legal system is characterised by 
collateral and bankruptcy laws that protect the creditor if a borrower defaults. As a reputable 
legal environment increases the banks’ recovery in the event of default, banks are expected to 
be more willing to provide credit on favourable terms (La Porta et al. 1997; Qian and Strahan 
2007). Thus, the better the legal environment, the easier credit access for firms will be. This 
argument leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The greater the strength of the legal system, the lower the probability that firms 
are denied credit. 
 
Bank lending decisions are also affected by the level of property rights protection (Bae 
and Goyal 2009). If private property is secured by clear laws enforced by the state, lenders 
can rely on the fact that they can enforce their rights quickly and efficiently if the borrower 
does not pay the principal and the interest on the date stipulated. A higher certainty of 
recovering the principal and the interest increases the banks’ willingness to provide credit 
upfront and therefore reduces the firms’ risk of being credit constrained. Based on these 
arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  The higher the level of property protection, the lower the probability that firms 




Access to finance for firms is also dependent on the quality of the judicial 
enforcement system. However, as the quality of judicial enforcement cannot be captured in a 
single index (Safavian and Sharma 2007), we investigate three different aspects that affect the 
enforcement of the law: (1) the number of procedures required to enforce a contract; (2) the 
time needed to resolve a dispute in the court; and (3) the cost of resolving a dispute in the 
court (court and lawyers’ fees). 
The number of procedural steps, that is, interactions between the parties or between the 
parties and the judge or court officer, required by law or commonly used, reflects the 
arduousness of the judicial enforcement system. This is because banks can be deterred from 
going to court if there are multiple procedural steps because the number of procedures 
implies additional effort and resources that have to be invested in recovering the credit. The 
greater the number of procedures necessary to recover the loan via legal action, the greater 
the risk the bank will face a loss if the borrower does not repay the debt and, therefore, the 
more reluctant the bank will be to grant credit to firms. Accordingly, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The lower the number of procedures, the lower the probability that firms are 
denied credit. 
 
Djankov et al. (2003) use the duration of dispute resolution in order to construct an 
index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution. They find that stronger procedural 
formalism is a strong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution and that stronger 
procedural formalism is associated with lower-quality justice. Similarly, Safavian and 
Sharma (2007) stress that reforms in creditor rights have little impact on bank lending in 
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countries and regions with very lengthy dispute resolution processes, but significant impact in 
countries and regions with rapid dispute resolution processes. The research by Fabbri (2010) 
suggests that even within a country, differences in the length of civil trials affect the cost of 
lending. Thus, the shorter the dispute resolution process in court, the more willing banks will 
be to grant credit to firms because they will be able to recover the loan more quickly. Based 
on this argument, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  The shorter the time to resolve a dispute in court, the lower the probability that 
firms are denied credit. 
 
The quality of judicial enforcement is also determined by the accessibility to the 
enforcement system, which is reflected in the costs of accessing the court. Djankov et al. 
(2008) construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement using the cost of the trial as 
well as the duration and the likely disposition of the assets. Their findings suggest that debt 
enforcement is highly inefficient and that this inefficiency correlates with underdeveloped 
debt markets. Moreover, Ahlquist and Prakash (2010) examine the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and the host countries’ contract enforcement environment and find 
that foreign direct investment is associated with lower contract enforcement costs. Thus, 
enforcement costs seem to influence economic behaviour, and we expect that court fees and 
lawyers’ fees, expressed as a percentage of the claim, influence the availability of loans for 
firms. The higher the costs for settling a dispute in court, the more reluctant banks will be to 
grant credit to firms. Against this backdrop, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H5:  The lower the costs incurred for settling a dispute at court, the lower the 




3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our research relies primarily on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE) conducted on behalf of the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It 
collects information about access to finance by firms within the European Union. The SAFE 
has been run on a given set of questions every six months since 2009 and systematically 
covers 11 Eurozone area countries (namely Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Firms in the sample were randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet business 
register. The sample was stratified by firm size class, economic activity and country. The 
sample was further constructed to offer approximately the same precision for micro-sized 
firms (1 to 9 employees), small firms (10 to 49 employees) and medium-sized firms (50 to 
249 employees). A group of large firms (250 or more employees) was also included, which 
covers less than 10% of the total sample. 
The sample sizes for each economic activity were selected to ensure adequate 
representation across the four largest activities: industry, construction, trade and services. 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, financial intermediation, public administration and the 
activities of households and extra-territorial organisations, as well as bodies and holding 
companies, were excluded. Moreover, the sample sizes in the participating countries were 
selected based on representation at the country level. The person interviewed in each 
company was a top-level executive (Owner, General Manager, Financial Director or Chief 
Accountant). The questionnaire was translated into the local language. For the robustness 
checks we used a subset of the SAFE dataset for which we had detailed information on the 
financial statements of the firms. 
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We integrated the data provided by the SAFE dataset with information from the 
quarterly Bank Lending Survey (BLS) run by national central banks on behalf of the 
European Central Bank. The BLS collects information about the banks’ lending activities in 
the previous three months and the banks’ propensity to lend in the next six months. It 
provides specific data on the banks’ propensity to lend to large and small/medium firms as 
well as households. We used the data on large and small/medium firms for the previous three 
months as controls for the availability of credit in the market. 
We also rely on the Eurostat database for general economic data. Eurostat is the 
statistical office of the European Union located in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the 
European Union with statistics at the European level that enable comparisons between 
countries and regions. We used Eurostat to access homogeneous data on GDP growth, 
unemployment rates, inflation and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration. 
In order to access data on the quality of the legal system we used variables from two 
different sources: (1) the World Bank and (2) the Heritage Foundation. With regard to the 
World Bank, we use the Doing Business dataset. It offers data on business regulations from 
2003 to the present and is considered highly reliable. With regard to the Heritage Foundation, 
we rely on the Index of Economic Freedom dataset. 
All the datasets used provide information that is revised annually for each country 
included in our dataset. 
3.2. Methodology 
Since the dependent variable in our regressions is binary (bank loan obtained or not 
obtained by a specific firm), we approached the analysis using traditional logit regression 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Because we rely on a panel dataset that is unmatched at firm 
level, we could not employ a fixed-effect panel regression that would have allowed 
consideration of the evolution of lending relationships through time at the firm level. 
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We approached the analysis from two different perspectives. We estimated a set of 
different regressions, where we entered the different independent variables one by one. This 
approach avoided multicollinearity problems linked to the fact that our independent variables 
are significantly correlated with each other. We also re-estimated our models by including the 
interaction between variables that measure the legal system and those that measure the 
effectiveness of the judicial system. This allowed us to examine their joint effect. 
In addition, we implemented a number of robustness checks. Since our approach 
might raise questions about the sample selection bias due to our use of a dataset that includes 
only firms that applied for a loan (12,504 out of 48,590), we re-estimated our hypotheses 
following Heckman's (1979) approach. We rely on the original dataset that contains 48,590 
complete observations and employed the binary response model with sample selection, where 
the dependent variable indicates whether the firm applied for a loan – an approach similar to 
Piga and Atzeni (2007) and Piga and Vivarelli (2004). The identification of the selection 
equation requires at least one variable that determines the demand for a loan, but is irrelevant 
in the regressions. We found good candidates in the following variables: (1) the change in the 
turnover of the firm, since growing firms are more likely to need additional finance and 
therefore to apply for a loan, even if this does not mean that they will be successful; (2) the 
change in the profit of the firm, since more profitable firms are less likely to apply for a loan, 
as they can use their profit to finance their activities (Myers and Majluf 1984); and (3) the 
firm’s independence, since firms that belong to a group are less likely to apply for a loan 
because they can rely on finance provided by the holding company or other group companies. 
All variables described above affect the firm’s decision on whether to apply for a loan, but 
should not affect the probability that the lender will decide to provide the requested finance to 
the firm. We also ran alternative selection models and always obtained results very similar to 
those obtained with the model presented in the analysis section. 
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Second, to reveal the joint role of these variables, we examined the opportunity to 
generate a construct representing the latent variable weakness of the legal system. To 
generate the construct, we first used confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether one 
factor could be extracted from our variables. Then, we used four out of five variables to 
generate the factor, which we defined as legal system weakness. We then re-estimated the 
original specification entering the factor instead. We estimated the regression according to 
both the basic logit regression and the Heckman selection process. 
Third, we retested the specification using a different set of variables. The European 
Central Bank compiles a dataset that contains additional and more detailed variables, namely 
financial figures for the surveyed firms. The financial statements are extracted from the 
Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk database. Thus, we retested the hypotheses by using the same 
independent variables but a different set of controls comprising profitability ratios, liquidity 
ratios, and leverage ratios, that is, variables that typically proxy the risk of the firm. 
Because we rely on data collected during a crisis, our results might merely reflect the 
increased importance of the judicial system for credit access. Because not all countries in our 
sample were affected by the financial crisis in the same way, we re-estimated our 
specifications by including only the countries that were hit by the crisis very marginally 
(namely Austria, France, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). Then we repeated our 
estimate by including the interaction between a dummy that identified countries marginally 
affected by the crisis and our variables of interest. If the roles of legal environment and 
judicial effectiveness were not affected by the crisis, we should not have seen any change in 
the results with respect to our original regression. 
We also re-estimated our models using sampling weights where the weights, 
originally included in the survey, were applied to adjust the sample to make it representative 
of the frame from which the sample was drawn. Moreover, because the original estimation of 
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the standard errors can suffer from clustering of errors at the country level, we re-estimated 
our specification using robust estimates of the standard errors. We also checked whether the 
results could be affected by the way in which we defined the independent variable. To do so 
we used a different definition of the quality of the judicial system (i.e. a dummy that 
identifies protective vs non-protective and effective vs non-effective contexts). In addition, 
we checked whether the results were affected by the estimation approach used. In order to 
examine such potential issues, we re-estimated the regressions using probit estimation. We 
also retested our regressions with a bootstrap estimation of the standard errors (Efron and 
Tibshirani 1998). 
3.3. Dependent Variables 
The SAFE survey includes a question to firm managers on whether their firm obtained 
the credit it applied for in the last six months. We use the answer to this question (the firm 
obtained all the credit requested = 1; the firm did not obtain the credit = 0) as a dependent 
variable. 
In order to pursue some of the robustness checks, we also examined whether the firms 
were only partially constrained. In this case, we used as a dependent variable whether the 
firm obtained the bulk of the loan it applied for, that is, more than 75% (the firm obtained the 
bulk of the credit = 1; otherwise = 0). We also used the answer to the question on whether the 
firm obtained less than 75% of the credit requested (the firm obtained less than 75% = 1; 
otherwise = 0) to investigate whether the firm obtained only a fraction of the credit it 
originally applied for. 
3.4. Independent Variables 
We used different independent variables for each hypothesis tested. We examined the 
strength of the legal rights (H1) by using the Strength of Legal Rights Index (STRENGTH) 
as computed by the World Bank. The index measures the degree to which collateral and 
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bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and therefore facilitate lending. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better legal protection and 
therefore a set of laws that is better designed to expand access to credit. We collected the 
rating for each year considered and for each country in our sample. The variable is country 
variant but time invariant for the years considered. 
We argue that the higher the level of property protection, the lower the probability 
that firms are denied credit (H2). In order to test this hypothesis, we relied on the Index of 
Economic Freedom as computed by the Heritage Foundation by using the variable Property 
Rights (PRO_PROTECT). This variable measures the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. Hence, it measures 
the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be 
expropriated. The index ranges from 0 to 100: the more solid the legal protection of property 
is the higher the country’s score. Again in this case, the variable is country variant but time 
invariant for the years considered. 
In order to test the impact of the number of procedural steps involved in a commercial 
dispute (H3) we used the data provided in the Doing Business dataset published by the World 
Bank (N_PROCEDURES). The World Bank defines a procedural step as any interaction, 
required by law or commonly used in practice, between the parties or between them and the 
judge or court officer. Other procedural steps, internal to the court or between the parties and 
their counsel are also counted. Procedural steps include filing and serving the case, assigning 
the case to a judge, the trial and judgment and the steps necessary to enforce the judgment. 
The variable is country variant and is time variant (but with only minor changes) in Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. 
Our fourth hypothesis argues that the longer the time required to resolve a dispute, the 
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higher the probability that firms are denied credit. Again, we rely on the Doing Business 
dataset and use the variable that records the average time needed to resolve a dispute in 
calendar days (TIME). The time is counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the 
lawsuit in court up until payment is made. It includes both the days when actions take place 
and the waiting periods between them. The variable is country variant and it is time variant 
(but with only minor changes) in Greece and Ireland. 
In our fifth hypothesis, we suggest that the costs for settling a dispute in court affect 
the probability that firms are denied credit. In this case we used the variable that reflects the 
costs incurred as a percentage of the claim (COST_PERC) as computed in the Doing 
Business dataset. The variable includes three types of costs: court costs, enforcement costs, 
and average lawyers’ fees. Court costs include all court costs that the plaintiff must advance 
to the court, regardless of the final cost to the plaintiff. Enforcement costs are all costs that 
the plaintiff must advance to enforce the judgment through a public sale of the opponent’s 
assets. Average lawyers’ fees are the average fees charged by a local lawyer to represent the 
plaintiff. The variable is country variant and is time variant (but with only a minor change) in 
the Netherlands alone. 
3.5. Controls 
We include a set of variables to control for the firm characteristics, the moment in 
time when the data were collected, the country and the economic context. In terms of firm 
characteristics, the SAFE dataset provides some information about the size of the firm by 
grouping the firms into four categories: micro, small, medium and large. We use three 
dummy variables that identify micro (MICRO), small (SMALL) and medium-sized 
(MEDIUM) firms. Our expectation is that larger firms are less likely to face a rejection 
because they are perceived as more secure and successful. 
In addition, the SAFE dataset clusters the firms according to four age categories: 
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younger than two years, between two and five years, between five and nine years and older 
than nine years. We used the 2_YEARS, 2_5_YEARS, and 5_9_YEARS dummy variables to 
identify the age group for each observation. According to previous research we expect older 
firms to be more likely to be successful when they apply for a loan (Berger and Udell 1995; 
Petersen and Rajan 1994): older firms have consolidated their reputations and that can be 
helpful when the banks have to make lending decisions (Martinelli 1997). 
We also controlled for the financial strategy pursued by the firm by taking into 
consideration the different sources of finance used during the last period. We used dummies 
identifying whether the firm had used trade credit (TRADE_CREDIT), leasing (LEASING), 
retained earnings (RET_EARNINGS) or had raised additional equity (EQUITY) in the last 
period. 
As explained above, in two cases the independent variables are time invariant at the 
country level and in the other cases the variability is very minor and only for a few countries. 
Thus, they present a very high correlation with the country. As a consequence, we did not 
include any control for the country that would have raised collinearity issues. However, we 
considered a set of country specific and time varying macroeconomic variables to capture the 
macroeconomic context in which firms operate. 
Specifically, we controlled for the change in the gross domestic product (GDP), 
inflation rate (INFLATION) and overall unemployment rate (UNEMPL_OVERALL) for 
each country and each half-year. These data were obtained from the Eurostat dataset. 
Moreover, we accounted for the overall financial context by using the European Central 
Bank’s BLS coefficients for small/medium and large firms (BLS). Because the BLS index is 
not available for all countries included in the analysis, we used the average index, when it 
was not available in a very limited number of cases and for smaller countries. Additionally, 
we considered the structure of the financial industry by using the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
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Index of bank concentration (HHI) in each country because previous research suggests bank 
competition influences credit access (Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández and Udell 2009; 
Neuberger, Pedergnana and Räthke-Döppner 2008). 
 The dataset provided unmatched observations for eight semesters, and therefore we 
used seven dummies identifying the semester when the observation was collected. 
 In the regressions based on the Heckman selection process, we employed a 
categorical variable (CHANGE_TURNOVER) to identify whether the turnover reduced (-1), 
was stable (0) or grew (+1) in the period considered. The same approach was applied to profit 
(CHANGE_PROFIT). Regrettably, the standard SAFE dataset does not provide any 
information about the monetary value of turnover or profit. These two variables and also a 
dummy variable that measures whether the firm belongs to a group or not (INDEPENDENT) 
are expected to affect the decision to apply for a loan. 
In the regressions that comprise the financial figures, we exploited a newly compiled 
dataset that augments the responses of the firms to SAFE with their detailed annual balance 
sheet and profit and loss information (Ferrando and Mulier 2013). Survey data for a given 
year are matched with balance sheet data of the year prior to the survey year. The rationale is 
that these are the most recent balance sheet data that firms had available to convince financial 
intermediaries to provide them external finance. This dataset contains 38,328 observations 
collected in the period 2009–2012 (Waves 3 to 9), 6,081 of which concern firms that applied 
for a loan. It includes detailed information about the firms’ financial statements derived from 
the Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk database. For our analyses we used financial leverage, 
financial pressure, profit margin and collateral. These variables are most commonly used in 
the literature for explaining the determinants of financial constraints and defined as follows. 
Financial leverage (FIN_LEV) equals the ratio of financial debt (i.e. the sum of short-term 
and long-term debt) to total assets and indicates the degree to which the firm is indebted. We 
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expect the relationship between financial leverage and credit constraints to be negative, as a 
large amount of debt on the balance sheet might make it difficult or costly for the firm to 
obtain additional funding. Financial pressure (FIN_PRES) is computed as a ratio of interest 
payments to earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). 
If the ratio is high, the firm pays a significant amount of interest, either because it is too 
indebted or because it pays a high rate of interest on the existing debt. In either case, banks 
will be less likely to grant credit. Profit margin (PRO_MAR) equals the ratio of operating 
profits/losses to turnover and is a proxy for the profitability of the firm. If the profit margin is 
high, firms will be more likely to obtain credit because high profitability increases the 
probability that they will be able to repay their loan. Collateral (COLL) is the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets. We expect the probability of obtaining credit to increase, if the ratio’s 
value is high, as collateral is available to secure the loan repayment. 
As an additional robustness check, we included the ratio of EBITDA to the difference 
of financial debt and cash holdings. The inclusion of this additional control variable results in 
a dataset of 6,081 observations of firms that applied for credit. We expect this ratio to be 
positively associated with the probability of obtaining credit, as a higher ratio suggests that 
the firm will be able to repay its debt quicker and will therefore be more likely to obtain a 
loan. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset we used contains 48,590 complete observations from 11 countries for the 
period between the first semester of 2009 and the second semester of 2012. The dataset was 
reduced to 12,504 observations by excluding firms that did not apply for a loan. The 
difference can be attributed to firms that either did not need finance (and therefore did not 
apply for a loan) or were discouraged from applying for a loan (i.e. firms that needed a loan 
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but did not submit an application because they thought that it would be rejected). Figure 1 
reports the percentage of firms having applied for a loan (lines) and of those that were 
successful (bars) as a percentage of all firms in the sample. These percentages vary 




Table 1A reports summary statistics for the overall dataset and for each country, table 
1B shows the data for the firms that applied for a loan. There are no missing countries in any 







 In our sample the majority of firms are either micro or small and only 7.5% of them 
are classified as large. Three quarters of the firms in the sample are independent, 76% are 
more than nine-years old. Overall, the majority of firms in the sample are small, independent 
and well established. Only about one-third of the firms enjoyed an increase in turnover 
(34%), whereas 28% did not experience any change and 38% found their turnover reduced in 
the relevant period. More than 45% experienced reduced profits, whereas only 27.3% 
enjoyed an increase. The statistics can be explained by the fact that the observations were 
made in the period between 2009 and 2012, thus falling into a period of overall economic 
stagnation. In terms of financing, firms appear to use leasing and trade credit quite 
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intensively. Retained earnings are used by 32% of the firms. The BLS index is +5.09, 
suggesting a reduction in credit availability, as positive values of this index are associated 
with a contraction of the credit provided by the banking system. The datum is in line with the 
more conservative lending policies pursued by the banks after the 2008 financial crisis and 
the introduction of the more stringent Basel III rules. 
 The coefficient that measures the strength of the legal system is rated between three 
(collateral and bankruptcy are not very well designed to expand access to credit; e.g. Italy, 
Portugal) and nine (collateral and bankruptcy are well designed to expand access to credit; 
e.g. Ireland). The property rights protection index reaches values between 50 (inefficient 
court system which is subject to delays; e.g. Italy) and 90 (private property is guaranteed by 
the state and the court system is efficient; e.g. Finland). The number of procedural steps 
involved in a commercial dispute ranges from 21 (e.g. Ireland) to 41 (e.g. Spain), whereas the 
time required to resolve a dispute is between 235 days (e.g. Finland) and 1,210 days (e.g. 
Italy). The costs of the claim range from 13.3% of the claim (e.g. Finland and Portugal) up to 
29.9% of the claim (e.g. Italy). 
 Moving from the overall dataset to the subsample that contains only firms that 
actually applied for a loan (12,504 observations), the distribution of firm dimension is very 
similar to that of the overall sample: the majority of the firms are either micro (24%) or small 
(34%), with nearly one-third medium-sized firms (31%). Large firms account for 11% of the 
subsample. Almost two-thirds of the firms (64%) experienced a reduced or stable turnover 
during the period considered. Only 27% of them enjoyed an increase in profit. In terms of 
financing, the firms rely on trade credit and leasing (43.8% and 42.9% respectively). 
Interestingly, firms that apply for a loan appear to rely more on alternative sources of finance 
because they are around 10% more likely to use trade credit and 9% more likely to rely on 
leasing. We also test for differences in the characteristics of the firms between the overall 
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sample and the subsample. However, in terms of firm age, firm dimension and firm 
performance (change in turnover and change in profit) there are no significant differences. 
 
5. Results 
 The results are reported in Table 2. The first regression (Specification A) considers 
only the controls. Subsequently, we entered the independent variables one at a time. This 
allowed us to examine the impact of each legal system variable by comparing the other 




 Specification A is significant and R2 is 0.0634. The size of the firm affects its access 
to credit: the bigger the firm, the less adversely affected is its access to credit. The same logic 
applies to the age of the firm: as the age class increases, the negative impact of age on credit 
access reduces, which suggests a relative lower probability of an application for credit being 
rejected. Different sources of finance negatively affect credit access: equity seems to be the 
strongest alternative to a loan, whereas leasing is not significant. As expected, the BLS index 
is negatively related to credit access: the less prone banks are to lend, the less likely firms are 
to be successful with loan application. Economic expansion (GDP) is positively related to 
credit access, whereas unemployment is negatively related. 
 Specification B includes the strength of the legal system (STRENGTH) and is 
significant. R2 improves to 0.0689. This implies that the variable improves the variance 
explained by 7.98% with respect to the basic regression. There is no change in the 
significance level of the controls. Only INFLATION, which was not significant in 
Specification A, proves significant and positively related to obtaining credit. The dependent 
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variable STRENGTH is highly significant and has the expected sign: the stronger the legal 
system, the higher the probability that a bank lends to the firm. Thus, H1 is confirmed. 
 Specification C allows for an investigation of the role of property protection 
(PRO_PROTECT). The specification is highly significant (p < 0.0001). R2 is at 0.0664, 
suggesting a limited contribution of the variable in explaining the overall variance. There is 
no change in the significance level of the controls except for LEASING, which is not 
significant. The dependent variable is significant at 0.001 and has the expected sign: the 
stronger the protection of property rights, the greater the probability that a bank lends to 
firms. Hence, H2 is also confirmed. 
Specification D introduces the number of procedures (N_PROCEDURES). It is 
highly significant (p < 0.0001). R2 improves to 0.0639, that is, by a mere 0.78% on 
Specification A. This suggests that the number of procedures explains only a small proportion 
of the variance. There is no change in the significance level of the controls except for 
INFLATION, which is not significant. RET_EARNINGS and BLS are significant at 0.01. 
The dependent variable N_PROCEDURES is highly significant at 0.01 and has the expected 
sign: the higher the number of procedures the plaintiff incurs, the lower the probability that a 
bank grants credit to the firm. For that reason, H3 is also confirmed. 
Specification E introduces the time (days) needed in order to resolve a dispute 
(TIME). The specification is highly significant (p < 0.0001). The measured R2 improves to 
0.0729, that is, by 13.03% on Specification A. Interestingly, there are no changes in the 
significance level of the controls except for LEASING (which is significant, even if only at 
0.10), GDP (which is not significant) and HHI (which is highly significant). The dependent 
variable TIME is significant at 0.01 and has the expected sign: the longer the time required to 




Specification F considers the cost of a legal proceeding as a percentage of the claim 
(COST_PERC). This specification is also highly significant (p < 0.0001). R2 improves to 
0.0732 and is the highest of all the regressions presented. Interestingly, there are no changes 
in the significance level of the controls except for GDP, which, in this case, is significant. 
The dependent variable COST_PERC is significant at the 0.01 level and has the expected 
sign: the higher the costs incurred in resolving disputes, the lower the probability that a bank 
grants credit to the firm. H5 is therefore also confirmed. 
To further investigate the relationships, we tested the boundary conditions of our 
results. Doing so involved accounting for the possibility that judicial enforcement could also 
amplify or mitigate the effect of creditor rights in addition to the direct impact of creditor 
rights and judicial enforcement on the likelihood of obtaining credit. Higher costs, longer 
durations, and greater complexity with regard to the number of legal procedures are likely to 
adversely affect strong creditor rights, as they make it more difficult for a bank to enforce a 
legal claim if a borrower defaults. At the same time, poor creditor rights are likely to severely 
limit the benefits of cheap, fast, and simple judicial enforcement because the collateral and 
bankruptcy rights granted do not offer a reasonable chance that the court will decide in the 
bank’s favour. In order to examine this aspect we interacted the judicial enforcement 
variables with the creditor protection variables, an approach similar to that of Safavian and 
Sharma (2007). Since our original judicial enforcement variables measured the 
ineffectiveness of the judicial enforcement system, we first reverse coded them and then 
renamed them (TIME became SPEED, COST_PERC became CHEAP and N_PROCEDURE 
became SIMPLE). The action ensured they pointed in the same direction as the creditor 
protection variables. Subsequently, we estimated six regressions, each of which included one 
creditor protection variable, one judicial enforcement variable, and their interaction. This 
approach allowed us to examine how SPEED, CHEAP and SIMPLE interacted with 
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Our results support the argument that both creditor rights and judicial enforcement 
affect credit access. With regard to the time required to resolve a dispute, the interaction of 
property rights protection and speed increases the probability of obtaining credit. In this case, 
the interaction substitutes for both property rights protection and speed. The same is true with 
regard to court and attorney costs. However, different results emerge with regard to the 
number of procedures, as property rights protection and reduced bureaucracy in court prevail 
over their joint effect by substituting it. Very similar results are obtained for the strength of 
the legal system: the interaction of the strength of the legal system with the time required to 
resolve a dispute and speed facilitates credit access, whereas the strength of the legal system 
and the number of procedures in disputes prevail over their interaction effect. Overall, the 
additional analyses lent further support to the important role of both creditor protection and 
judicial enforcement in granting credit. 
5.1. Robustness Checks 
The analysis presented so far provides clear results. Nevertheless, some additional 
robustness checks are needed before making any generalisations. 
The first robustness check investigates if our results are affected by the sample 
selection bias. In order to deal with this issue, we re-estimated the regressions by relying on 
the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman 1979). We modelled the selection process 
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using variables that measured the change in turnover, the change in profit and whether the 
firm belonged to a group. The results, resulting from the use of a Heckman probit estimation, 
are reported in Table 5. We also ran alternative selection models and always obtained results 





All specifications were significant. In addition, there were no major changes in the 
sign and the significance level with respect to the regression presented in Table 2: with regard 
to firm dimension, the variable MEDIUM proved not to be significant in Specifications C and 
D in the Heckman selection specification (it was formerly significant, but borderline). 
RET_EARNINGS was less significant in the Heckman selection than it used to be, whereas 
LEASING was more significant. From the general environment point of view there were 
minor changes in BLS, GDP (which became significant only at 0.05 for Specification B) and 
in INFLATION, which was not significant in Specification E. Interestingly, there are no 
changes in the sign and the significance level of the independent variables. In fact, the 
significance decreases slightly in the instance of the number of procedures 
(N_PROCEDURES). Overall, the results strongly confirmed all previous findings in terms of 
supporting the hypotheses. 
The second robustness check investigated the joint effect of the independent variables. 
As it was not possible to enter all covariates in the regression at the same time due to 
multicollinearity problems, we developed a construct that we defined as weak legal system 
(WEAK_ SYS) by incorporating the variables mentioned above t. This construct aims at 
measuring the overall weakness of the legal system. In order to set it up, we first reversed the 
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STRENGTH and PRO_PROTECT in order to generate variables that measured the weakness 
of the legal system and the low level of property rights protection. Thus, all measures 
considered point in the same direction: the higher the value of our variables, the lower the 
quality of the legal system. Then, we implemented exploratory factor analysis. We obtained 
the highest Cronbach alpha of 0.6400 (which is acceptable) by considering only four of the 
five variables: STRENGTH, N_PROCEDURE, COST_PERC, and PRO_PROTECT. 
Accordingly, we decided to exclude TIME from our construct. Factor analysis suggested that 
one factor could be extracted, as only the first factor had an eigenvalue higher than 1 (namely 
2.5868) and it explained 64.67% of the variance. All variables load on the factor at 0.46 or 
higher. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.62, which is acceptable. 
Thus, we generated the score of the variable that measures the weakness of the legal system 
(WEAK_SYS) and entered it in the regression. The results are reported in Table 6 (logit 
regression) and Table 7 (Heckman selection). Moreover, in this case we ran alternative 
selection models and always obtained results very similar to those presented in the original 







The specification is highly significant (p < 0.0001). R2 is 0.0684, slightly higher than 
in Specification A. Interestingly, there are no major changes in the significance level of the 
controls. The dependent variable WEAK_SYS is significant at the 0.01 level and has the 
expected negative sign. The finding suggests that the legal system affects the availability of 
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credit to firms: the weaker the legal system, the lower the probability that a bank lends to a 
firm. With regard to the Heckman selection, the specification is also significant. There are 
minor changes in the significance level of some controls, but there is no change in the 
significance level of the factor WEAK_SYS. The results provide additional support to our 
original findings: a legal system that is weak overall leads to a reduction in the lines of credit 
provided to firms. 
We also re-estimated the models using the newly compiled dataset that, although 
smaller, contains a different set of controls, namely detailed financial figures and ratios based 
on the financial figures of a subsample of the surveyed companies. This approach has the 
advantage that we could objectively control for the financial position of firms when they 
applied for a bank loan. The results are reported in Tables 8 (basic model) and 9 (Heckman 
selection). For the Heckman model, we also ran alternative selection models and always 
obtained results very similar to those presented in the original regressions. In particular, no 







The empirical results show that firms with higher debt ratios and firms that are using a 
larger proportion of their profits to pay interest have a higher probability of being rejected. 
More profitable firms or firms with more collateral, in contrast, have a greater chance of 
obtaining a loan. As in the previous models, we further tested the role of the quality of the 
legal system by entering the variables characterising the legal system one by one. All the 
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results of the baseline analysis using the logit model or through the Heckman sample 
selection model were confirmed. 
As an additional robustness test, we substituted financial leverage with the ratio of 
EBITDA to the difference of financial debt and cash. The estimated coefficients are 
significant in all specifications and, more importantly, the results on the quality of the legal 
system are confirmed. 
Since we rely on data collected during a crisis, our results might merely reflect the 
increased importance of the judicial system in access to credit. During this period, banks 
might have feared increases in defaults on loans, which could have raised the importance of 
well-functioning creditor rights and judicial enforcement. However, not all countries in our 
sample were affected equally by the financial crisis. We therefore first re-estimated our 
specifications by including only the countries that were hit by the crisis very marginally, that 
is, countries that did not face any sovereign debt problems or whose economy suffered only 
from minor setbacks and recovered quite quickly (namely Austria, France, Finland, Germany 
and the Netherlands). The regressions do not present major changes in the significance of the 
variables included. More importantly, there is no change in the significance level of the 
creditor rights and judicial enforcement variables: all five variables are significant and there 
is no change in the sign. Second, we generated a dummy variable that discriminated between 
countries that were only marginally affected by the financial crisis and countries that were 
severely affected. We then interacted this dummy with each of the creditor rights and judicial 
enforcement variables and re-estimated our models by including both the original and the 
interacted variables. Again in this case the original variables have the same sign and the same 
significance level. These results suggest that our main findings are not affected by the 
financial crisis. 
We also retested our model using a set of different independent variables. We 
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generated a dummy variable that measured whether the legal context is effective in enforcing 
the law (1) or not (0) by using the median values of each independent variable as thresholds. 
The dummy variables are always significant and have the same sign as in the original model 
(detailed results not reported here). 
Moreover, we ran some econometric robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the 
regressions by using a different econometric approach, namely probit regression instead of 
logit regression. This allowed us to check whether our results are sensitive to the econometric 
approach used in our estimations. Detailed results are not reported here. Interestingly, there is 
no change in the significance and the sign of the variables entered in the regression. Second, 
we re-estimated the standard errors by using a bootstrap estimation of the standard errors 
(Efron and Tibshirani 1998). Again there is no change in the significance of the variables 
entered in the regressions. Third, we ran an additional robust check by estimating our basic 
regression and the Heckman selection model using sampling weights. SAFE provides weights 
to restore the proportions of the economic weight (in terms of number of employees) for 
every size, economic activity and country. Detailed results are not reported here, but there are 
no changes in the significance of our legal/judicial system variables. We also re-estimated the 
specification taking into consideration that errors can be clustered at the country level. In this 
case, we used a robust estimation of the standard errors. Again, detailed results are not 
reported here, but no changes emerged. Finally, we re-estimated the specification including 
dummy variables identifying the industries (detailed results not reported). Again, there are no 
changes with respect to our original findings. 
Our robustness checks suggest that the original findings are robust to sample 





6. Economic Impact 
So far our analysis shows that the creditor protection and judicial enforcement 
statistically affect the access to credit. However, we did not check the economic robustness 
and solidity of our results as well as their economic impact. In this section we will examine 
both aspects. 
Our basic regressions look at firms that applied for a loan and discriminate between 
those that obtained the entire requested amount and those that did not obtain it. In fact, firms 
can be credit constrained when they obtain only a proportion of the requested credit. The 
impact of creditor rights and judicial enforcement is higher if it contributes to the reduction of 
any form of financial constraint (partial or total) by helping firms to obtain the entire 
requested loan. Thus, creditor rights and judicial enforcement should not only increase the 
probability of obtaining the total credit required, but should also reduce the probability that a 
firm obtains only a proportion of it. In order to examine this aspect, we re-estimated our 
regressions using two alternative dependent variables: whether the firm obtained the bulk of 
the credit requested (> 75%) and whether the firm obtained a lesser part of the credit 
requested (< 75%). According to our reasoning, STRENGTH and PRO_PROTECT have to 
be negatively related to both dependent variables because the stronger the legal system and 
the higher the property protection, the lower the probability of being granted only a 
proportion of the loan (be it a major or minor proportion). Similarly, N_PROCEDURE, 
COST_PERC, and TIME should be positively related to obtaining only a fraction of the loan 
because the greater the number of the procedures involved, the time spent in court and the 
cost of legal proceedings, the higher the probability that banks will grant only a proportion of 
the requested loan in order to reduce the risk incurred. 
The results of the re-estimated regressions are reported in Tables 10 and 11. We also 
re-estimated the regressions using the entire dataset and applying the Heckman selection. The 
33 
 







Our expectations find strong support in the cases of STRENGTH and 
PRO_PROTECT. In both the coefficient proves negative and statistically significant. 
Interestingly a decreasing trend emerges when we look at firms that are partially credit 
constrained: the coefficients in the regressions that rely on firms that obtained the bulk of the 
loan requested are greater than those for the sample of firms that obtained only a proportion 
of the loans requested. 
Also in the case of COST_PERC and TIME, the results confirm our expectations 
when we compare the coefficients of the firms that obtain the entire amount of credit 
requested to those that obtained the bulk of it. However, the change in the coefficient 
between the two groups is very small and statistically not significant. Finally, for 
N_PROCEDURE our expectations are confirmed, but only when we compare the firms that 
obtained the loan with those that obtained only a minor proportion of it. Table 12 presents the 




The results suggest that creditor rights and judicial enforcement support access to the 




The final step of our analysis is to examine the economic impact of creditor rights and 
judicial enforcement. The results so far show that the legal system has a positive effect on the 
probability that a firm obtains the credit requested. However, it is important to examine the 
economic impact of such a statistically significant relationship. In order to do so, we estimate 
the probability of obtaining credit for each independent variable at their lowest and highest 
figure. For instance, with regard to the cost of the procedure, we estimated the probability of 
a firm in Italy obtaining credit (where the cost is 29.9% of the claim) and for a firm in 
Finland (where the cost is 13.3% of the claim). 




Turning to the strength of the legal system, the value of the variable in the dataset is 
between 3 (Italy) and 9 (Ireland). Our calculations show that a firm operating in a country 
with a very strong legal system (in our case Ireland, probability 0.7589) is almost 30% more 
likely to obtain the credit it applies for than a firm which operates in a country with weak 
legal system (Italy, probability 0.5870) and that this difference is statistically significant. 
With regard to property protection the difference is smaller (around 19%), but nevertheless 
economically relevant (0.6026 vs 0.7172) and statistically significant. 
Both time and costs present very similar differences: the probability of getting access 
to the total credit requested is between 54% and 55% in a country with weaker law 
enforcement (in our sample Italy), while it is between 73% and 75% in a country where law 
enforcement is effective (in our sample Finland). The variable that generates the smallest 
differential in the probability to obtain credit is the number of procedures (the difference 
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being below 9%). However, the difference is statistically significant and economically 
relevant. 
Finally, we re-estimated the probability of obtaining credit by using the factor 
WEAK_ENFORCEMENT. Interestingly enough, the country with the weakest enforcement 
capability appears to be Italy while the one with the strongest enforcement capability is 
Ireland. In the case of Italy, the probability of obtaining credit for the average firm is 0.5435 




Our research suggests that strong creditor and property rights as well as a rigorous 
judicial enforcement system support the bank’s lending decision favouring the provision of 
credit to firms. This is because better creditor protection makes it easier for banks to deal 
with borrower risk, as the probability of their recovering the loan in the face of a default 
increases. Thus, firms benefit from a high level of creditor protection and rigorous judicial 
enforcement due to higher probability of obtaining the external finance required for their 
ongoing activities or investments. These results proved robust against a set of econometric 
tests. 
Our findings have considerable implications for both firms and banks. With regard to 
firms, our results suggest that a firm operating in a country with weak creditor protection and 
a low-quality judicial enforcement system can face a competitive disadvantage compared to a 
firm located in a country with strong creditor protection and a high-quality judicial 
enforcement system. This is because the firm faces more difficulties in accessing bank loans, 
which, in turn, constrains its development and growth, as alternative sources of finance, such 
as leasing and trade credit, cannot fill the financing gap (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
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Maksimovic 2008). Interestingly, we find differences of up to 30% in terms of the probability 
of obtaining credit among countries that are all member states of the European Union. The 
context (i.e. the single-market policies pursued in the European Union, such as the free 
exchange of goods or services and the freedom of establishment) implies that differences in 
the probability of obtaining credit may have considerable implications for firms located in 
countries where access to credit is more difficult because of weak creditor protection and 
poor judicial enforcement because they cannot be protected by trade barriers. The big 
differences in the probability of obtaining credit suggest that firms located in a weak legal 
environment may not only be adversely affected when they try to enter a foreign market, but 
might also struggle to maintain their local market share because of the competition from 
foreign firms. In addition, as the freedom of establishment facilitates the relocation of 
affected firms to another EU member state, differences in the legal system can also motivate 
firms to move to countries where the legal system allows for easier access to credit. Thus, the 
quality and efficiency of the legal system can have a considerable impact on a country’s GDP 
growth and job creation. Our argument is in line with previous research, which suggests that 
the credit granted in a supportive legal environment is provided on more favourable 
conditions (Qian and Strahan 2007)and also to firms investing in intangible assets, or firms 
with highly volatile returns (Giannetti 2003). This aspect is even more important because 
there is some consistency at the country level in terms of creditor protection and judicial 
enforcement: Italy ranks last in four out of five dimensions, while Finland ranks at the top in 
three out of five dimensions. 
With regard to banks, our results suggest that a bank that operates in a country with 
strong creditor protection and a high-quality judicial enforcement system enjoys a 
competitive advantage. This is because a bank operating in a country with strong creditor 
protection and a high-quality judicial enforcement system can be more confident that it will 
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retrieve the loan if a borrower defaults than a bank operating in a country with weak creditor 
protection system and a low-quality judicial enforcement system. Our results are in line with 
previous findings at the macroeconomic level suggesting that the legal environment affects 
the development of debt markets (Djankov et al. 2008; La Porta et al. 1997) and that the 
development of debt markets affects economic growth (Levine 1998). 
Our results have relevant policy implications for banks and firms. Improving the 
quality of the relevant law and law enforcement could facilitate credit access for firms. While 
we are not the first to come to the conclusion that better laws improve external debt 
financing, our evidence is very specific and direct because it is based on the firms’ semi-
annual self-assessment of their financing situation. Second, our findings suggest that a 
judicial enforcement system that is characterised by short, cheap and simple proceedings 
creates favourable conditions for bank lending. Even though changing legal codes and 
improving the quality of the judicial enforcement system is difficult, the economic returns of 
such changes can be relevant as shown by our economic analysis. 
Our research also contains some limitations. First, we examine only European firms 
because of the characteristics of the dataset used. It would be interesting to replicate the 
research in other areas in order to verify the robustness of the role played by different legal 
systems around the world. The enlargement of the dataset could also allow for an 
examination of whether the legal environment is equally relevant in developing and in 
developed economies. Second, our dataset is cross sectional, meaning we could not examine 
the impact of the legal system on a specific firm’s loan request over time. However, we are 
confident that this aspect did not affect our results. Nevertheless, such an analysis could offer 
a more fine-grained understanding of the impact of legal systems. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the dataset and context, the study indicates that the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the law and the judicial enforcement system might play a 
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 Figure 1 
 









Table 1A Basic Statistics – Overall Dataset 
 
Notes: Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan application; dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); 
dummies for age (less than two years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummy for independent firms; change in turnover and in profit (reduction –1, 
unchanged 0, increase 1); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; 
unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, property rights protection, time to resolve a dispute, costs to 




obs 48590 obs 2724 obs 2813 obs 6989 obs 7369 obs 2631
Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan Requested Whether the firm applied for a loan 0,257        0,437    0 1 0,221          0,415    0 1 0,253      0,435    0 1 0,230       0,421    0 1 0,337      0,473    0 1 0,155      0,362      0 1
Loan Obtained Whether the firm obtained a loan 0,169        0,375    0 1 0,182          0,386    0 1 0,194      0,395    0 1 0,183       0,386    0 1 0,171      0,377    0 1 0,130      0,337      0 1
Micro Micro firms 0,334        0,472    0 1 0,344          0,475    0 1 0,386      0,487    0 1 0,300       0,458    0 1 0,310      0,462    0 1 0,398      0,490      0 1
Small Small firms 0,335        0,472    0 1 0,348          0,477    0 1 0,383      0,486    0 1 0,312       0,463    0 1 0,313      0,464    0 1 0,391      0,488      0 1
Medium Medium firms 0,257        0,437    0 1 0,233          0,423    0 1 0,183      0,387    0 1 0,293       0,455    0 1 0,291      0,454    0 1 0,174      0,380      0 1
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,021        0,142    0 1 0,040          0,195    0 1 0,013      0,112    0 1 0,018       0,133    0 1 0,008      0,091    0 1 0,014      0,116      0 1
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age 0,080        0,272    0 1 0,069          0,253    0 1 0,078      0,268    0 1 0,086       0,280    0 1 0,074      0,262    0 1 0,049      0,216      0 1
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,135        0,342    0 1 0,123          0,328    0 1 0,127      0,333    0 1 0,124       0,330    0 1 0,136      0,343    0 1 0,120      0,325      0 1
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,770        0,421    0 1 0,187          0,791    -1 1 0,076      0,829    -1 1 0,143       0,801    -1 1 0,296-      0,824    -1 1 0,119      0,824      -1 1
Change_turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,038-        0,846    -1 1 0,034          0,812    -1 1 0,066-      0,843    -1 1 0,012-       0,826    -1 1 0,399-      0,795    -1 1 0,005      0,814      -1 1
Change_profit Change in profit in the last semester 0,183-        0,834    -1 1 0,390          0,488    0 1 0,229      0,420    0 1 0,448       0,497    0 1 0,318      0,466    0 1 0,493      0,500      0 1
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings 0,320        0,467    0 1 0,235          0,424    0 1 0,256      0,437    0 1 0,163       0,369    0 1 0,427      0,495    0 1 0,518      0,500      0 1
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,343        0,475    0 1 0,434          0,496    0 1 0,229      0,420    0 1 0,504       0,500    0 1 0,296      0,457    0 1 0,394      0,489      0 1
Leasing Use of leasing 0,339        0,473    0 1 0,080          0,272    0 1 0,068      0,252    0 1 0,129       0,335    0 1 0,026      0,159    0 1 0,072      0,259      0 1
Equity Increase in equity 0,061        0,240    0 1 0,733          0,443    0 1 0,712      0,453    0 1 0,790       0,408    0 1 0,788      0,409    0 1 0,737      0,441      0 1
BLS Bank Lending Survey index 5,091        10,069  -14 60 1,002          3,812    -10 20 5,803      4,485    -1,1 17 1,239       6,573    -5 23 1,693      5,693    -5 17 5,859      4,181      -1,125 17
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,507-        2,905    -8,5 4 1,113          2,027    -3,8 2,8 0,763      1,645    -2,8 2,3 0,694       3,637    -5,1 4 1,406-      1,551    -3,8 0,1 0,749      3,225      -8,5 3,4
Inflation Inflation rate 1,912        1,204    -1,7 4,7 2,415          1,046    0,4 3,6 2,471      1,022    0 3,4 1,460       0,884    0,2 2,5 1,793      1,241    -0,2 3,1 2,798      0,715      1,6 3,3
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 10,982      5,771    3,25 25,7 4,389          0,246    4 5 7,678      0,551    6,9 8,45 6,699       0,959    5,4 8,05 21,269    2,630    17,75 25,7 7,874      0,796      6,95 9,55
HHI Herfindahl index bank concentration 0,088        0,077    0,0206 0,37 0,040          0,002    0,04 0,04 0,130      0,019    0,11 0,16 0,028       0,004    0,02 0,03 0,057      0,006    0,051 0,07 0,338      0,031      0,301 0,37
Strength Strength of the legal system 5,859        1,778    3 9 7,00            -        7 7 6,00        -        6 6 7,00          -        7 7 6,00        -         6 6 8,00        -          8 8
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 32,335      5,940    21 41 90,00          -        90 90 80,00      -        80 80 90,00       -        90 90 70,00      -         70 70 91,07      2,048      90 95
Time Time to resolve a dispute 599,638    293,93  235 1210 397,00       -        397 397 505,00    -        505 505 394,00     -        394 394 515,00    -         515 515 364,68    36,595   235 375
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 19,070      5,663    13,3 29,9 18,00          -        18 18 17,70      -        17,7 17,7 14,40       -        14,4 14,4 17,20      -         17,2 17,2 13,30      -          13,3 13,3
N_procedures Number of procedural steps 32,335      5,940    21 41 25,00          -        25 25 26,00      -        26 26 30,00       -        30 30 40,51      0,500    40 41 33,00      -          33 33
Spain FinlandGermanyOverall Austria Belgium
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obs 7269 obs 2817 obs 2543 obs 7182 obs 3191 obs 3062
Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan Requested Whether the firm applied for a loan 0,299        0,458    0 1 0,281          0,449    0 1 0,151      0,359    0 1 0,328       0,469    0 1 0,115      0,319    0 1 0,199      0,399      0 1
Loan Obtained Whether the firm obtained a loan 0,239        0,427    0 1 0,114          0,318    0 1 0,069      0,254    0 1 0,206       0,405    0 1 0,059      0,235    0 1 0,116      0,320      0 1
Micro Micro firms 0,299        0,458    0 1 0,400          0,490    0 1 0,397      0,489    0 1 0,307       0,461    0 1 0,357      0,479    0 1 0,364      0,481      0 1
Small Small firms 0,313        0,464    0 1 0,383          0,486    0 1 0,394      0,489    0 1 0,307       0,461    0 1 0,341      0,474    0 1 0,347      0,476      0 1
Medium Medium firms 0,293        0,455    0 1 0,179          0,383    0 1 0,174      0,379    0 1 0,304       0,460    0 1 0,233      0,423    0 1 0,219      0,414      0 1
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,048        0,214    0 1 0,007          0,084    0 1 0,007      0,086    0 1 0,018       0,134    0 1 0,026      0,158    0 1 0,010      0,100      0 1
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age 0,099        0,299    0 1 0,060          0,238    0 1 0,036      0,186    0 1 0,097       0,296    0 1 0,116      0,320    0 1 0,057      0,233      0 1
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,138        0,345    0 1 0,145          0,352    0 1 0,109      0,312    0 1 0,138       0,345    0 1 0,145      0,352    0 1 0,174      0,379      0 1
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,038        0,850    -1 1 0,290-          0,844    -1 1 0,099-      0,881    -1 1 0,069-       0,837    -1 1 0,020      0,851    -1 1 0,155-      0,828      -1 1
Change_turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,147-        0,837    -1 1 0,425-          0,805    -1 1 0,193-      0,867    -1 1 0,261-       0,793    -1 1 0,069-      0,873    -1 1 0,309-      0,804      -1 1
Change_profit Change in profit in the last semester 0,260        0,439    0 1 0,283          0,450    0 1 0,411      0,492    0 1 0,304       0,460    0 1 0,270      0,444    0 1 0,099      0,299      0 1
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings 0,188        0,391    0 1 0,490          0,500    0 1 0,723      0,448    0 1 0,439       0,496    0 1 0,330      0,470    0 1 0,302      0,459      0 1
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,357        0,479    0 1 0,162          0,368    0 1 0,312      0,463    0 1 0,289       0,453    0 1 0,371      0,483    0 1 0,266      0,442      0 1
Leasing Use of leasing 0,059        0,236    0 1 0,080          0,271    0 1 0,080      0,271    0 1 0,040       0,197    0 1 0,024      0,153    0 1 0,015      0,120      0 1
Equity Increase in equity 0,769        0,421    0 1 0,787          0,409    0 1 0,723      0,448    0 1 0,804       0,397    0 1 0,708      0,455    0 1 0,795      0,404      0 1
BLS Bank Lending Survey index 5,659        5,075    -1,125 17 5,808          4,457    -1,1 17 5,835      4,161    -1,1 17 0,366       3,976    -6 25 12,006    10,659  -14 50 26,097    22,859   -10 60
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,167        2,017    -3,1 2 5,870-          1,330    -7,1 -3,1 0,186      2,192    -6,4 2,2 1,296-       2,746    -5,5 1,7 0,883      1,645    -1,2 3,7 1,447-      1,948      -3,2 1,9
Inflation Inflation rate 1,579        0,876    0,1 2,3 2,557          1,455    1 4,7 0,629      1,466    -1,7 1,9 2,185       0,985    0,8 3,3 1,960      0,847    0,9 2,8 2,084      1,582      -0,9 3,6
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 9,411        0,351    8,85 10,1 17,873       5,399    9,25 25,7 14,634    0,766    11,5 15,3 8,993       1,128    7,8 10,9 4,511      0,633    3,25 5,4 13,290    2,451      9,5 17,2
HHI Herfindahl index bank concentration 0,059        0,003    0,0545 0,06 0,132          0,012    0,12 0,15 0,090      0,008    0,08 0,1 0,038       0,005    0,03 0,04 0,204      0,001    0,203 0,21 0,119      0,002      0,115 0,12
Strength Strength of the legal system 7,000        -        7 7 4,00            -        4 4 9,00        -        9 9 3,00          -        3 3 6,00        -         6 6 3,00        -          3 3
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 74,966      5,000    70 80 53,25          4,684    50 60 90,00      -        90 90 51,25       2,163    50 55 90,00      -         90 90 70,00      -          70 70
Time Time to resolve a dispute 390,000    -        390 390 1 020,26    68,818 900 1100 562          64,369 515 650 1 210        -        1210 1210 514,00    -         514 514 552,23    11,385   547 577
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 17,400      -        17,4 17,4 14,40          -        14,4 14,4 26,90      -        26,9 26,9 29,90       -        29,9 29,9 24,25      0,229    23,9 24,4 13,21      0,455      13 14,2
N_procedures Number of procedural steps 29,000      -        29 29 39,00          -        39 39 21,00      -        21 21 37,89       1,666    37 41 26,00      -         26 26 34,52      1,139      34 37
Italy Netherlands PortugalFrance Greece Ireland
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Table 1B Basic Statistics – Loan Obtained 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummy for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummy for independent firms; change in turnover and in profit (reduction -1, unchanged 0, increase 1); dummies for 
sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–





obs 12504 obs 602 obs 712 obs 1605 obs 2487 obs 407
Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan Obtained Whether the firm obtained a loan 0,656        0,475    0 1 0,826          0,380    0 1 0,765      0,424    0 1 0,796       0,403    0 1 0,508      0,500    0 1 0,843      0,364      0 1
Micro Micro firms 0,241        0,427    0 1 0,229          0,421    0 1 0,326      0,469    0 1 0,189       0,392    0 1 0,232      0,422    0 1 0,314      0,465      0 1
Small Small firms 0,339        0,473    0 1 0,375          0,485    0 1 0,431      0,496    0 1 0,288       0,453    0 1 0,318      0,466    0 1 0,383      0,487      0 1
Medium Medium firms 0,314        0,464    0 1 0,281          0,450    0 1 0,184      0,388    0 1 0,367       0,482    0 1 0,333      0,471    0 1 0,246      0,431      0 1
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,020        0,141    0 1 0,035          0,184    0 1 0,011      0,105    0 1 0,016       0,126    0 1 0,006      0,075    0 1 0,005      0,070      0 1
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age 0,070        0,256    0 1 0,063          0,243    0 1 0,066      0,248    0 1 0,068       0,252    0 1 0,067      0,250    0 1 0,047      0,211      0 1
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,123        0,329    0 1 0,090          0,286    0 1 0,138      0,345    0 1 0,095       0,294    0 1 0,127      0,333    0 1 0,111      0,314      0 1
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,801        0,399    0 1 0,764          0,425    0 1 0,719      0,450    0 1 0,817       0,387    0 1 0,813      0,390    0 1 0,789      0,409      0 1
Change_turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,030-        0,868    -1 1 0,226          0,805    -1 1 0,131      0,839    -1 1 0,166       0,834    -1 1 0,288-      0,844    -1 1 0,111      0,851      -1 1
Change_profit Change in profit in the last semester 0,220-        0,844    -1 1 0,023          0,840    -1 1 0,084-      0,864    -1 1 0,041-       0,850    -1 1 0,411-      0,803    -1 1 0,005-      0,842      -1 1
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings 0,365        0,482    0 1 0,483          0,500    0 1 0,239      0,427    0 1 0,569       0,495    0 1 0,374      0,484    0 1 0,526      0,500      0 1
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,438        0,496    0 1 0,347          0,476    0 1 0,385      0,487    0 1 0,236       0,425    0 1 0,564      0,496    0 1 0,550      0,498      0 1
Leasing Use of leasing 0,429        0,495    0 1 0,532          0,499    0 1 0,313      0,464    0 1 0,631       0,483    0 1 0,386      0,487    0 1 0,511      0,500      0 1
Equity Increase in equity 0,075        0,263    0 1 0,128          0,334    0 1 0,076      0,265    0 1 0,166       0,372    0 1 0,029      0,169    0 1 0,084      0,277      0 1
BLS Bank Lending Survey index 4,513        9,166    -14 60 1,346          4,581    -10 20 6,058      4,450    -1,1 17 1,871       6,742    -5 23 2,080      5,964    -5 17 5,719      4,118      -1,125 17
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,753-        2,895    -8,5 4 0,982          2,101    -3,8 2,8 0,855      1,555    -2,8 2,3 0,469       3,695    -5,1 4 1,538-      1,614    -3,8 0,1 0,865      2,993      -8,5 3,4
Inflation Inflation rate 1,895        1,204    -1,7 4,7 2,340          1,057    0,4 3,6 2,542      0,949    0 3,4 1,411       0,887    0,2 2,5 1,672      1,294    -0,2 3,1 2,840      0,692      1,6 3,3
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 11,559      5,843    3,25 25,7 4,400          0,259    4 5 7,677      0,537    6,9 8,45 6,719       0,985    5,4 8,05 21,050    2,627    17,75 25,7 7,816      0,803      6,95 9,55
HHI Herfindahl index bank concentration 0,075        0,063    0,02 0,37 0,040          0,002    0,04 0,04 0,129      0,018    0,11 0,16 0,028       0,005    0,02 0,03 0,057      0,006    0,05 0,07 0,338      0,031      0,30 0,37
Strength Strength of the legal system 5,665        1,744    3 9 7,000          -        7 7 6,000      -        6 6 7,000       -        7 7 6,000      -         6 6 8,000      -          8 8
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 72,336      14,320  50 95 90,000       -        90 90 80,000    -        80 80 90,000     -        90 90 70,000    -         70 70 91,020    2,017      90 95
Time Time to resolve a dispute 631,212    315,10  235 1210 397,000     -        397 397 505,000 -        505 505 394,000   -        394 394 515,000 -         515 515 367,088 32,37      235 375
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 19,310      5,76      13,3 29,9 18,000       -        18 18 17,700    -        17,7 17,7 14,400     -        14,4 14,4 17,200    -         17,2 17,2 13,300    -          13,3 13,3
N_procedures Number of procedural steps 33,459      5,891    21 41 25,000       -        25 25 26,000    -        26 26 30,000     -        30 30 40,549    0,498    40 41 33,000    -          33 33
Germany Spain FinlandOverall Austria Belgium
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obs 2174 obs 791 obs 385 obs 2353 obs 378 obs 610
Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan Obtained Whether the firm obtained a loan 0,800        0,400    0 1 0,406          0,491    0 1 0,457      0,499    0 1 0,630       0,483    0 1 0,510      0,501    0 1 0,580      0,494      0 1
Micro Micro firms 0,224        0,417    0 1 0,281          0,450    0 1 0,317      0,466    0 1 0,240       0,427    0 1 0,274      0,447    0 1 0,216      0,412      0 1
Small Small firms 0,341        0,474    0 1 0,401          0,490    0 1 0,384      0,487    0 1 0,302       0,459    0 1 0,363      0,482    0 1 0,385      0,487      0 1
Medium Medium firms 0,331        0,471    0 1 0,252          0,434    0 1 0,249      0,433    0 1 0,350       0,477    0 1 0,256      0,437    0 1 0,295      0,456      0 1
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,048        0,214    0 1 0,005          0,071    0 1 0,010      0,102    0 1 0,023       0,150    0 1 0,029      0,168    0 1 0,008      0,090      0 1
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age 0,077        0,266    0 1 0,046          0,209    0 1 0,036      0,187    0 1 0,091       0,287    0 1 0,115      0,320    0 1 0,039      0,195      0 1
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,126        0,332    0 1 0,118          0,322    0 1 0,127      0,334    0 1 0,127       0,334    0 1 0,130      0,336    0 1 0,184      0,387      0 1
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,816        0,388    0 1 0,771          0,420    0 1 0,719      0,450    0 1 0,820       0,384    0 1 0,761      0,427    0 1 0,828      0,378      0 1
Change_turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,106        0,857    -1 1 0,223-          0,884    -1 1 0,023-      0,891    -1 1 0,076-       0,853    -1 1 0,069-      0,887    -1 1 0,084-      0,868      -1 1
Change_profit Change in profit in the last semester 0,149-        0,848    -1 1 0,383-          0,834    -1 1 0,174-      0,892    -1 1 0,285-       0,805    -1 1 0,173-      0,883    -1 1 0,323-      0,824      -1 1
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings 0,268        0,443    0 1 0,320          0,467    0 1 0,468      0,500    0 1 0,341       0,474    0 1 0,363      0,482    0 1 0,159      0,366      0 1
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,246        0,431    0 1 0,613          0,487    0 1 0,748      0,435    0 1 0,514       0,500    0 1 0,504      0,501    0 1 0,489      0,500      0 1
Leasing Use of leasing 0,474        0,499    0 1 0,231          0,422    0 1 0,408      0,492    0 1 0,363       0,481    0 1 0,476      0,500    0 1 0,400      0,490      0 1
Equity Increase in equity 0,073        0,260    0 1 0,091          0,288    0 1 0,140      0,348    0 1 0,050       0,218    0 1 0,040      0,197    0 1 0,013      0,114      0 1
BLS Bank Lending Survey index 5,624        4,935    -1,125 17 6,318          4,643    -1,1 17 5,924      4,212    -1,1 15 0,396       4,140    -6 25 12,525    11,517  -14 50 26,066    22,429   -10 60
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,283        1,956    -3,1 2 5,742-          1,436    -7,1 -3,1 0,128      2,317    -6,4 2,2 1,504-       2,818    -5,5 1,7 1,117      1,756    -1,2 3,7 1,322-      2,019      -3,2 1,9
Inflation Inflation rate 1,639        0,848    0,1 2,3 2,793          1,423    1 4,7 0,586      1,476    -1,7 1,9 2,125       1,007    0,8 3,3 1,863      0,858    0,9 2,8 1,955      1,616      -0,9 3,6
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 9,424        0,348    8,85 10,1 16,721       5,134    9,25 25,7 14,615    0,780    11,5 15,3 8,964       1,139    7,8 10,9 4,424      0,679    3,25 5,4 13,063    2,434      9,5 17,2
HHI Herfindahl index bank concentration 0,059        0,003    0,05 0,06 0,129          0,011    0,12 0,15 0,090      0,008    0,08 0,1 0,038       0,005    0,03 0,04 0,204      0,001    0,20 0,21 0,119      0,002      0,12 0,12
Strength Strength of the legal system 7,000        -        7 7 4,000          -        4 4 9,000      -        9 9 3,000       -        3 3 6,000      -         6 6 3,000      -          3 3
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 75,262      4,994    70 80 53,679       4,825    50 60 90,000    -        90 90 51,133     2,093    50 55 90,000    -         90 90 70,000    -          70 70
Time Time to resolve a dispute 390,000    -        390 390 1 005,828  66,45    900 1100 559,53    63,55    515 650 1 210,00  -        1210 1210 514,000 -         514 514 552,803 11,86      547 577
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 17,400      -        17,4 17,4 14,400       -        14,4 14,4 26,900    -        26,9 26,9 29,900     -        29,9 29,9 24,263    0,22       23,9 24,4 13,232    0,47        13 14,2
N_procedures Number of procedural steps 29,000      -        29 29 39,000       -        39 39 21,000    -        21 21 38,030     1,749    37 41 26,000    -         26 26 34,580    1,186      34 37
France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal
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Table 2 Regressions – Obtaining Credit 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, property 
rights protection, time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504
LR chi2(21) 1021,15 LR chi2(22) 1109,54 LR chi2(22) 1068,63 LR chi2(22) 1028,06 LR chi2(22) 1173,44 LR chi2(22) 1178,42
Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Bank loan obtained Pseudo R2 0,0634 Pseudo R2 0,0689 Pseudo R2 0,0664 Pseudo R2 0,0639 Pseudo R2 0,0729 Pseudo R2 0,0732
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,6064 0,0775 *** -0,6140 0,0778 *** -0,6153 0,0777 *** -0,6162 0,0776 *** -0,6284 0,0781 *** -0,6232 0,0782 ***
Small Small firms -0,2728 0,0729 *** -0,2746 0,0732 *** -0,2804 0,0731 *** -0,2832 0,0731 *** -0,2972 0,0735 *** -0,2977 0,0736 ***
Medium Medium firms -0,1092 0,0730 -0,1000 0,0732 -0,1089 0,0731 -0,1133 0,0730 -0,1228 0,0735 * -0,1252 0,0736 *
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,1373 0,1385 -0,1763 0,1392 -0,1215 0,1391 -0,1493 0,1387 -0,1917 0,1396 -0,1401 0,1394
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,4470 0,0756 *** -0,4365 0,0758 *** -0,4341 0,0758 *** -0,4374 0,0757 *** -0,4378 0,0760 *** -0,4270 0,0761 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,2548 0,0595 *** -0,2262 0,0599 *** -0,2366 0,0597 *** -0,2481 0,0596 *** -0,2352 0,0600 *** -0,2420 0,0599 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,0889 0,0425 ** -0,1220 0,0428 *** -0,1122 0,0427 *** -0,0887 0,0425 ** -0,1188 0,0428 ** -0,1152 0,0428 ***
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0,2721 0,0412 *** -0,2282 0,0416 *** -0,2428 0,0415 *** -0,2690 0,0412 *** -0,1861 0,0420 *** -0,1753 0,0421 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0,0245 0,0417 -0,0609 0,0421 -0,0546 0,0421 -0,0267 0,0418 -0,0775 0,0422 * -0,0722 0,0422 *
Equity Increase in equity -0,2923 0,0763 *** -0,3449 0,0767 *** -0,3362 0,0768 *** -0,3071 0,0764 *** -0,3356 0,0770 *** -0,3662 0,0775 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0098 0,0025 *** -0,0054 0,0025 ** -0,0104 0,0025 *** -0,0103 0,0025 *** -0,0158 0,0025 *** -0,0178 0,0026 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0903 0,0098 *** 0,0439 0,0110 *** 0,0517 0,0113 *** 0,0797 0,0106 *** 0,0167 0,0115 0,0753 0,0098 ***
Inflation Inflation rate -0,0248 0,0228 0,0607 0,0247 ** 0,0286 0,0242 -0,0100 0,0236 0,0401 0,0235 * -0,0304 0,0228
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0684 0,0037 *** -0,0760 0,0038 *** -0,0681 0,0037 *** -0,0622 0,0044 *** -0,0850 0,0040 *** -0,0860 0,0040 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -0,0171 0,3510 -1,0617 0,3696 *** -0,8528 0,3728 ** -0,1774 0,3530 -1,0449 0,3615 *** -1,2857 0,3652 ***
Strength Strength of the legal system 0,1325 0,0141 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 0,0129 0,0019 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps -0,0129 0,0049 ***
Time Time to resolve a dispute -0,0973 0,0001 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute -0,0488 0,0039 ***
_cons Constant 2,3403 0,1051 *** 1,5038 0,1367 *** 1,3218 0,1804 *** 2,6791 0,1668 *** 3,0251 0,1212 *** 3,6388 0,1512 ***
Specification FSpecification CSpecification A Specification B Specification D Specification E
Included in the regressions
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Table 3 Regressions – Obtaining Credit (Interaction with Property Protection) 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained profits, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank Lending 
Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for property rights protection, time to resolve a 
dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504
LR chi2(24) 1304,2 LR chi2(24) 1235,54 LR chi2(24) 1221,67
Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Bank loan obtained Pseudo R2 0,0810 Pseudo R2 0,0768 Pseudo R2 0,0759
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,5966 0,0784 *** -0,5980 0,0783 *** -0,6072 0,0783 ***
Small Small firms -0,2655 0,0739 *** -0,2690 0,0737 *** -0,2812 0,0737 ***
Medium Medium firms -0,1137 0,0738 -0,1127 0,0737 -0,1240 0,0737 *
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,2975 0,1411 ** -0,1160 0,1395 -0,2270 0,1406
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,4570 0,0765 *** -0,4355 0,0762 *** -0,4393 0,0762 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,2419 0,0603 *** -0,2458 0,0601 *** -0,2409 0,0602 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,1135 0,0432 *** -0,1273 0,0431 *** -0,0957 0,0431 **
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0,1313 0,0424 *** -0,1594 0,0423 *** -0,1577 0,0423 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0,0924 0,0426 ** -0,0838 0,0424 ** -0,0699 0,0424 *
Equity Increase in equity -0,3166 0,0781 *** -0,3553 0,0783 *** -0,2949 0,0775 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0125 0,0027 *** -0,0148 0,0027 *** -0,0179 0,0026 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0351 0,0118 *** 0,0734 0,0120 *** 0,0149 0,0117
Inflation Inflation rate -0,0086 0,0243 -0,0615 0,0253 ** -0,0097 0,0244
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0735 0,0053 *** -0,0724 0,0047 *** -0,0778 0,0043 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -0,0638 0,3948 -0,6453 0,4017 -0,9772 0,3770 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection -0,0440 0,0076 *** -0,1760 0,0237 *** 0,1585 0,0125 ***
Speed Speed (Reverse of time to resolve dispute) 0,8239 0,7556
I_speed_Prot Interaction Property rights protection * Speed 0,0274 0,0109 **
Cheap Cheap (Reverse of costs for settling a dispute) -0,0963 0,0213 ***
I_cheap_prot Interaction Property rights protection * Cheap 0,0022 0,0003 ***
Simple Simple (Reverse of number of procedural steps) 9,4269 0,8931 ***
I_simple_prot Interaction Property rights protection * Simple -0,1205 0,0106 ***
_cons constant 3,4078 0,4286 *** 9,9334 1,5755 *** -9,6815 1,0252 ***
Included in the regressions
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Table 4 Regressions – Obtaining Credit (Interaction with Strength of the Legal System) 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, time to 
resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504
LR chi2(24) 1285,28 LR chi2(24) 1261,83 LR chi2(24) 1186,67
Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Bank loan obtained Pseudo R2 0,0799 Pseudo R2 0,0784 Pseudo R2 0,0737
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,5877 0,0784 *** -0,5754 0,0784 *** -0,5840 0,0781 ***
Small Small firms -0,2567 0,0739 *** -0,2368 0,0739 *** -0,2448 0,0736 ***
Medium Medium firms -0,1080 0,0738 -0,0809 0,0737 -0,0864 0,0735
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,2547 0,1403 * -0,1782 0,1399 -0,1854 0,1396
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,4465 0,0765 *** -0,4487 0,0763 *** -0,4610 0,0760 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,2357 0,0603 *** -0,2249 0,0602 *** -0,2272 0,0601 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,1206 0,0431 *** -0,1471 0,0431 *** -0,1354 0,0430 ***
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0,1399 0,0424 *** -0,1419 0,0424 *** -0,1714 0,0423 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0,1031 0,0425 ** -0,0964 0,0424 ** -0,0822 0,0423 *
Equity Increase in equity -0,3350 0,0778 *** -0,3557 0,0781 *** -0,3203 0,0773 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0115 0,0030 *** -0,0041 0,0030 -0,0051 0,0027 *
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0270 0,0116 ** 0,0483 0,0112 *** 0,0326 0,0115 ***
Inflation Inflation rate 0,0167 0,0249 -0,0116 0,0254 0,0225 0,0255
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0538 0,0049 *** -0,0738 0,0042 *** -0,0929 0,0051 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentratio -0,5991 0,3935 -1,2195 0,3949 *** -1,2735 0,3810 ***
Strength_legal_sys Strength of the legal system -0,4563 0,0635 *** -1,5770 0,1908 *** 0,5659 0,0750 ***
Speed Speed (Reverse of time to resolve dispute) -0,7855 0,5050
I_strength_speed Interaction Strength * Speed 0,5638 0,0934 ***
Cheap Cheap (Reverse of costs for settling a dispute) -0,0616 0,0128 ***
I_strength_cheap Interaction Strength * Cheap 0,0210 0,0024 ***
Simple Simple (Reverse of number of procedural steps) 1,3072 0,5256 **
I_strength_simple Interaction Strength * Simple -0,3078 0,0652 ***
_cons constant 2,7176 0,2527 *** 6,5277 0,9282 *** -0,1089 0,6059
Included in the regressions
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Table 5 Regressions – Obtaining Credit (Heckman Selection Model) 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, property 
rights protection, time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps.. In addition, the selection model relies on a dummy for independent firms and 
on the change in turnover and in profit (reduction -1, unchanged 0, increase 1). 
Sig.: * <.1; ** <.05; *** <.01 
 
 
Number of obs 48590 Number of obs 48590 Number of obs 48590 Number of obs 48590 Number of obs 48590 Number of obs 48590
Censored obs 36086 Censored obs 36086 Censored obs 36086 Censored obs 36086 Censored obs 36086 Censored obs 36086
Uncensored obs 12504 Uncensored obs 12504 Uncensored obs 12504 Uncensored obs 12504 Uncensored obs 12504 Uncensored obs 12504
Wald chi2(21) 61,98 Wald chi2(22) 47,44 Wald chi2(22) 63,26 Wald chi2(22) 58,82 Wald chi2(22) 55,86 Wald chi2(22) 72,78
Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0,0013 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0,0001 Prob > chi2 0
Log likelihood -35172 Log likelihood -35126 Log likelihood -35150 Log likelihood -35169 Log likelihood -35096 Log likelihood -35096
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,2293 0,0524 *** -0,2054 0,0503 *** -0,2605 0,0597 *** -0,2328 0,0541 *** -0,2377 0,0551 *** -0,2773 0,0596 ***
Small Small firms -0,0957 0,0349 *** -0,0846 0,0320 *** -0,1123 0,0395 *** -0,0996 0,0357 *** -0,1052 0,0365 *** -0,1261 0,0410 ***
Medium Medium firms -0,0334 0,0294 -0,0244 0,0262 -0,0384 0,0328 -0,0347 0,0296 -0,0376 0,0299 -0,0480 0,0347
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,0642 0,0556 -0,0736 0,0499 -0,0625 0,0613 -0,0690 0,0556 -0,0859 0,0561 -0,0708 0,0644
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,1828 0,0422 *** -0,1590 0,0397 *** -0,1948 0,0463 *** -0,1786 0,0425 *** -0,1771 0,0426 *** -0,1983 0,0463 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,1034 0,0292 *** -0,0829 0,0261 *** -0,1059 0,0316 *** -0,1006 0,0292 *** -0,0960 0,0287 *** -0,1127 0,0323 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,0337 0,0181 * -0,0410 0,0177 * -0,0483 0,0208 ** -0,0335 0,0181 * -0,0460 0,0192 ** -0,0529 0,0214 **
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0,1094 0,0243 *** -0,0815 0,0210 *** -0,1078 0,0257 *** -0,1078 0,0245 *** -0,0747 0,0210 *** -0,0823 0,0230 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0,0150 0,0165 -0,0285 0,0149 * -0,0286 0,0186 -0,0160 0,0165 -0,0369 0,0171 ** -0,0384 0,0197 *
Equity Increase in equity -0,1137 0,0365 *** -0,1188 0,0364 *** -0,1446 0,0425 *** -0,1192 0,0375 *** -0,1303 0,0387 *** -0,1656 0,0444 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey Index -0,0037 0,0012 *** -0,0017 0,0010 * -0,0044 0,0014 *** -0,0040 0,0013 *** -0,0059 0,0016 *** -0,0078 0,0018 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0347 0,0076 *** 0,0134 0,0054 ** 0,0223 0,0065 *** 0,0302 0,0074 *** 0,0059 0,0048 0,0331 0,0075 ***
Inflation Inflation rate -0,0103 0,0093 0,0217 0,0097 ** 0,0115 0,0109 -0,0043 0,0094 0,0159 0,0098 -0,0135 0,0108
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0274 0,0049 *** -0,0270 0,0053 *** -0,0299 0,0055 *** -0,0249 0,0047 *** -0,0333 0,0063 *** -0,0391 0,0066 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -0,0487 0,1368 -0,4063 0,1443 *** -0,3916 0,1725 ** -0,1131 0,1385 -0,4246 0,1564 *** -0,5489 0,1898 ***
Strength Strength of the legal system 0,0470 0,0103 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 0,0054 0,0013 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps -0,0051 0,0021 **
Time Time to resolve a dispute -0,0379 0,0001 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute -0,0216 0,0041 ***
_cons Constant -0,0751 0,2662 -0,5402 0,1833 *** -0,3337 0,2668 0,0551 0,3034 0,1740 0,3277 0,7481 0,4456 *
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,1107 0,0161 *** 0,1042 0,0173 *** 0,1142 0,0161 *** 0,1102 0,0163 *** 0,1104 0,0163 *** 0,1170 0,0157 ***
Change_Turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,0236 0,0104 ** 0,0200 0,0103 * 0,0282 0,0108 *** 0,0241 0,0105 ** 0,0246 0,0104 ** 0,0307 0,0104 ***
Change_Profit Change in profit in the last semester -0,0609 0,0089 *** -0,0579 0,0093 *** -0,0622 0,0089 *** -0,0609 0,0089 *** -0,0605 0,0089 *** -0,0626 0,0088 ***
_cons -0,7485 0,0141 *** -0,7429 0,0152 *** -0,7514 0,0140 *** -0,7482 0,0142 *** -0,7481 0,0143 *** -0,7536 0,0136 ***
/athrho 1,2107 0,3260 *** 1,4444 0,3872 *** 1,0209 0,3395 *** 1,2160 0,3391 *** 1,2212 0,3437 *** 0,9332 0,3178 ***
rho 0,8369 0,0977 0,8946 0,0773 0,7702 0,1381 0,8385 0,1007 0,8400 0,1012 0,7321 0,1475
Bank loan obtained
included in the regressions
Specification F (Heckman)Specification C (Heckman)Specification A (Heckman) Specification B (Heckman) Specification D (Heckman) Specification E  (Heckman)
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Table 6 Regression with Factor Weakness of the Judicial System 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; factor for the weakness of the legal system. 




Number of obs 12504
LR chi2(22) 1101,28
Prob > chi2 0,0000
Bank loan obtained Pseudo R2 0,0684
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,6240 0,0778 ***
Small Small firms -0,2898 0,0732 ***
Medium Medium firms -0,1120 0,0733
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,1548 0,1392
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,4262 0,0759 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,2291 0,0598 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,1142 0,0427 ***
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0,2272 0,0416 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0,0593 0,0421
Equity Increase in equity -0,3541 0,0769 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0102 0,0025 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0453 0,0110 ***
Inflation Inflation rate 0,0403 0,0241 *
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0678 0,0037 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -1,0788 0,3689 ***
Weak_Sys Weakness of the judicial system -0,2251 0,0251 ***
_cons _cons 2,2797 0,1057 ***
Included in the regressions
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Table 7 Regression with Factor Weakness of the Judicial System (Factor with Heckman Selection) 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase in equity); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; factor for the weakness of the legal system. In addition, 
the selection model relies on a dummy for independent firms and on the change in turnover and in profit (reduction -1, unchanged 0, increase 1). 








Prob > chi2 0.0000
Bank loan obtained Log likelihood -35132.83
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0.2538 0.0598 ***
Small Small firms -0.1113 0.0390 ***
Medium Medium firms -0.0374 0.0318
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0.0741 0.0595
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0.1843 0.0453 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0.0992 0.0306 ***
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0.0474 0.0203 **
Trade_credit Use of trade credit -0.0971 0.0245 ***
Leasing Use of leasing -0.0305 0.0180 *
Equity Increase in equity -0.1468 0.0427 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection) Included in the regressions
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0.0041 0.0014 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0.0182 0.0061 ***
Inflation Inflation rate 0.0165 0.0107
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0.0287 0.0055 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -0.4671 0.1744 ***
Weak_Sys Weakness of the judicial system -0.0928 0.0209 ***
_cons _cons -0.0059 0.3228
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0.1127 0.0163 ***
Change_turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0.0274 0.0107 **
Change_profit Change in profit in the last semester -0.0617 0.0089 ***
_cons -0.7501 0.0142 ***




Table 8 Regressions – Subsample with Financial Performance 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); financial performance of the firm: financial leverage (ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets), 
financial pressure (ratio of interest payments to EBITDA), profit margin (ratio of operating profits/losses to turnover) and collateral (ratio of fixed assets to total assets); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, property rights protection, 
time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 6,253 Number of obs 6,253 Number of obs 6,253 Number of obs 6,253 Number of obs 6,253 Number of obs 6,253
LR chi2(18) 737,54 LR chi2(19) 797,8 LR chi2(19) 786,87 LR chi2(19) 769,36 LR chi2(19) 793,2 LR chi2(19) 790,74
Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Pseudo R2 0,0894 Pseudo R2 0,0967 Pseudo R2 0,0953 Pseudo R2 0,0932 Pseudo R2 0,0961 Pseudo R2 0,0958
Bank Loan Obtained Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,1130 0,1070 -0,1340 0,1070 -0,1210 0,1070 -0,0988 0,1070 -0,1250 0,1070 -0,1230 0,1070
Small Small firms 0,0670 0,0938 0,0498 0,0943 0,0545 0,0943 0,0529 0,0941 0,0407 0,0944 0,0388 0,0944
Medium Medium firms -0,0103 0,0918 -0,0193 0,0923 -0,0143 0,0924 -0,0153 0,0922 -0,0220 0,0923 -0,0222 0,0923
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,0213 0,3740 -0,0070 0,3760 0,0151 0,3740 0,0057 0,3750 -0,0007 0,3750 0,0028 0,3750
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,4530 0,1320 *** -0,4400 0,1320 *** -0,4270 0,1320 *** -0,4600 0,1320 *** -0,4430 0,1320 *** -0,4420 0,1320 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,1850 0,0909 ** -0,1740 0,0913 * -0,1700 0,0912 * -0,1830 0,0911 ** -0,1750 0,0913 * -0,1790 0,0912 *
Fin_Lev Total debt divided by total assets -1,0890 0,1480 *** -1,0620 0,1480 *** -1,1300 0,1480 *** -1,0450 0,1480 ** -1,0790 0,1480 *** -1,0850 0,1480 ***
Fin_Pre Interest divided by EBITDA -0,4890 0,0691 *** -0,4730 0,0691 *** -0,4720 0,0692 *** -0,4760 0,0690 *** -0,4690 0,0692 *** -0,4800 0,0691 ***
Pro_Mar Operating profit divided by turnover 1,1540 0,3080 *** 1,0660 0,3090 *** 1,0880 0,3090 *** 1,1000 0,3090 *** 1,0660 0,3090 *** 1,0500 0,3090 ***
Coll Fixed assets divided by total assets 0,6370 0,1350 *** 0,6140 0,1360 *** 0,5760 0,1360 *** 0,6570 0,1350 *** 0,6130 0,1360 *** 0,5960 0,1360 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0071 0,00131 *** -0,003 0,00144 ** -0,0069 0,00133 *** -0,00569 0,00134 *** -0,00609 0,00134 *** -0,00734 0,00133 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0822 0,0151 *** 0,0408 0,0159 ** 0,025 0,0171 0,071 0,0151 *** 0,0351 0,0163 ** 0,0787 0,015 ***
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0555 0,0053 *** -0,0639 0,00546 *** -0,0631 0,00549 *** -0,0322 0,00667 *** -0,071 0,00577 *** -0,0699 0,00573 ***
Strength Strength of the legal system 0,157 0,0204 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 0,0193 0,00277 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps -0,0477 0,00849 ***
Time Time to resolve a dispute -0,0722 9,67E-05 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute -0,0355 0,00487 ***
_const Constant 1,912 0,146 *** 1,2 0,173 *** 0,848 0,21 *** 3,38 0,303 *** 2,666 0,18 *** 2,852 0,198 ***
Included in the regressions
Specification FSpecification A Specification B Specification C Specification D Specification E
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Table 9 Regressions – Subsample with Financial Performance (Heckman) 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for bank loan obtained; dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies for age (less than two 
years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); financial performance of the firm: financial leverage (ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets), 
financial pressure (ratio of interest payments to EBITDA), profit margin (ratio of operating profits/losses to turnover) and collateral (ratio of fixed assets to total assets); Bank 
Lending Survey index; GDP growth; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal system, property rights protection, 
time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. In addition, the selection model relies on a dummy for independent firms and on the change in 
turnover and in profit (reduction -1, unchanged 0, increase, 1). 
Sig.: * <.1; ** <.05; *** <.01 
 
 
Specification A (Heckman) Specification B (Heckman) Specification C (Heckman) Specification D (Heckman) Specification E  (Heckman) Specification F (Heckman)
Number of obs 38328 Number of obs 38328 Number of obs 38328 Number of obs 38328 Number of obs 38328 Number of obs 38328
Censored obs 31985 Censored obs 31985 Censored obs 31985 Censored obs 31985 Censored obs 31985 Censored obs 31985
Uncensored obs 6253 Uncensored obs 6253 Uncensored obs 6253 Uncensored obs 6253 Uncensored obs 6253 Uncensored obs 6253
Wald chi2(19) 225,93 Wald chi2(20) 359,54 Wald chi2(20) 388,48 Wald chi2(20) 285,53 Wald chi2(20) 339,31 Wald chi2(20) 337
Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0
Log likelihood -20653 Log likelihood -20624 Log likelihood -20631 Log likelihood -20638 Log likelihood -20627 Log likelihood -20628
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,0538 0,0622 -0,0702 0,0640 -0,0638 0,0642 -0,0470 0,0630 -0,0646 0,0638 -0,0636 0,0638
Small Small firms 0,0519 0,0540 0,0376 0,0558 0,0412 0,0561 0,0427 0,0550 0,0335 0,0557 0,0329 0,0557
Medium Medium firms 0,0067 0,0529 -0,0023 0,0546 0,0004 0,0548 0,0025 0,0538 -0,0032 0,0545 -0,0034 0,0545
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,0033 0,2140 -0,0212 0,2200 0,0048 0,2200 -0,0141 0,2170 -0,0160 0,2190 -0,0120 0,2190
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,2650 0,0780 *** -0,2640 0,0795 *** -0,2530 0,0797 *** -0,2720 0,0790 *** -0,2650 0,0794 *** -0,2630 0,0793 ***
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age -0,1080 0,0527 ** -0,1050 0,0541 * -0,1140 0,0543 *** -0,1090 0,0535 ** -0,1060 0,0540 * -0,1080 0,0539 **
Fin_Lev Total debt divided by total assets -0,6190 0,0914 *** -0,6200 0,0904 *** -0,6620 0,0908 ** -0,6060 0,0905 *** -0,6290 0,0906 *** -0,6330 0,0906 ***
Fin_Pre Interest divided by EBITDA -0,2810 0,0420 *** -0,2820 0,0417 *** -0,2820 0,0417 *** -0,2800 0,0418 *** -0,2780 0,0418 *** -0,2850 0,0418 ***
Pro_Mar Operating profit divided by turnover 0,6520 0,1780 *** 0,6200 0,1810 *** 0,6340 0,1820 *** 0,6360 0,1790 *** 0,6210 0,1810 *** 0,6120 0,1810 ***
Coll Fixed assets divided by total assets 0,3700 0,0795 *** 0,3680 0,0807 *** 0,3460 0,0809 *** 0,3890 0,0801 *** 0,3670 0,0805 *** 0,3570 0,0804 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0041 0,0008 ** -0,0018 0,0009 ** -0,0041 0,0008 *** -0,0033 0,0008 *** -0,0035 0,0008 *** -0,0043 0,0008 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product 0,0464 0,0091 *** 0,0234 0,0095 *** 0,0153 0,0102 * 0,0410 0,0091 *** 0,0202 0,0097 ** 0,0453 0,0091 ***
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate -0,0324 0,0036 *** -0,0379 0,0036 *** -0,0374 0,0035 *** -0,0196 0,0040 *** -0,0419 0,0038 *** -0,0411 0,0038 ***
Strength Strength of the legal system 0,0908 0,0126 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection 0,0108 0,0017 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps -0,0267 0,0057 ***
Time Time to resolve a dispute -0,0417 0,0060 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute -0,0203 0,0032 ***
_const Constant 0,5840 0,3410 * 0,3620 0,3190 0,2150 0,3190 1,4950 0,4010 *** 1,1870 0,3620 *** 1,2820 0,3660 ***
 
Independent Whether the firm is independent 0,0258 0,0258 *** 0,0255 0,0257 *** 0,0256 0,0257 *** 0,0257 0,0258 *** 0,0256 0,0257 *** 0,0256 0,0257 ***
Change_Turnover Change in turnover in the last semester 0,0116 0,0116 *** 0,0115 0,0115 *** 0,0115 0,0115 *** 0,0115 0,0116 ** 0,0115 0,0115 ** 0,0115 0,0115 ***
Change_Profit Change in profit in the last semester 0,0118 0,0119 *** 0,0119 0,0120 *** 0,0120 0,0120 *** 0,0119 0,0120 *** 0,0119 0,0120 *** 0,0119 0,0120 ***
_cons -1,2590 0,0243 *** -1,2610 0,0241 *** -1,2620 0,0241 *** -1,2600 0,0242 *** -1,2600 0,0241 *** -1,2610 0,0241 ***
/athrho 0,355 0,199 * 0,239 0,193 0,2147 0,194  0,297 0,194  0,251 0,196  0,255 0,193  
rho 0,341 0,176 0,235 0,182 0,212 0,186 0,289 0,288 0,246 0,183 0,25 0,181
included in the regressions
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Table 10 – Regressions: More than 75% of the Bank Loan Obtained 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for partial bank loan obtained (more than 75%); dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); 
dummies for age (less than two years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, 
increase in equity); Bank Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the 
legal system, property rights protection, time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 11021 Number of obs 11021 Number of obs 11021 Number of obs 11021 Number of obs 11021 Number of obs 11021
LR chi2(21) 279,26 LR chi2(22) 312,96 LR chi2(22) 295,73 LR chi2(22) 287,18 LR chi2(22) 340 LR chi2(22) 323,79
Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Bank loan more than 75% obtained Pseudo R2 0,0443 Pseudo R2 0,0496 Pseudo R2 0,0469 Pseudo R2 0,0455 Pseudo R2 0,0539 Pseudo R2 0,0513
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms -0,4706 0,1315 *** -0,4755 0,1316 *** -0,4645 0,1316 *** -0,4903 0,1318 *** -0,4559 0,1319 *** -0,4627 0,1318 ***
Small Small firms -0,3191 0,1168 *** -0,3242 0,1169 *** -0,3072 0,1169 *** -0,3409 0,1171 *** -0,2926 0,1173 ** -0,2986 0,1171 **
Medium Medium firms -0,2182 0,1146 * -0,2382 0,1149 ** -0,2181 0,1148 * -0,2258 0,1147 ** -0,2077 0,1151 * -0,2065 0,1150 *
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years -0,4169 0,4234 -0,3759 0,4243 -0,4145 0,4237 -0,4317 0,4234 -0,3459 0,4248 -0,3998 0,4240
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age -0,0240 0,1599 -0,0220 0,1600 -0,0359 0,1600 -0,0128 0,1601 -0,0185 0,1602 -0,0276 0,1601
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,0137 0,1120 0,0022 0,1122 0,0048 0,1121 0,0172 0,1120 0,0085 0,1123 0,0081 0,1122
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings -0,0318 0,0767 -0,0014 0,0769 -0,0052 0,0769 -0,0259 0,0768 -0,0080 0,0769 -0,0154 0,0768
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,2410 0,0739 *** 0,1907 0,0743 *** 0,2118 0,0742 *** 0,2460 0,0740 *** 0,1512 0,0746 ** 0,1522 0,0749 **
Leasing Use of leasing 0,2525 0,0739 *** 0,2891 0,0743 *** 0,2754 0,0741 *** 0,2526 0,0740 *** 0,3037 0,0743 *** 0,2942 0,0741 ***
Equity Increase in equity 0,2385 0,1202 ** 0,2931 0,1208 ** 0,2799 0,1207 ** 0,2099 0,1206 * 0,2775 0,1205 ** 0,2982 0,1206 **
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index -0,0066 0,0046 -0,0119 0,0045 *** -0,0057 0,0045 -0,0081 0,0047 * 0,0002 0,0045 0,0003 0,0046
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product -0,0185 0,0171 0,0366 0,0199 * 0,0301 0,0212 -0,0370 0,0182 ** 0,0729 0,0211 *** -0,0088 0,0175
Inflation Inflation rate 0,2369 0,0422 *** 0,1728 0,0446 *** 0,1944 0,0438 *** 0,2666 0,0431 *** 0,2141 0,0431 *** 0,2617 0,0420 ***
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 0,0521 0,0063 *** 0,0629 0,0066 *** 0,0539 0,0063 *** 0,0658 0,0080 *** 0,0753 0,0071 *** 0,0701 0,0070 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentrationn 0,8651 0,5859 2,1958 0,6247 *** 1,8912 0,6325 *** 0,5855 0,6172 2,1240 0,5941 *** 2,2761 0,6200 ***
Strength Strength of the legal system -0,1547 0,0265 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection -0,0148 0,0036 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps -0,0276 0,0097 ***
Time Time to resolve a dispute 0,1113 0,0001 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 0,0480 0,0072 ***
_cons Constant -3,9255 0,1869 *** -3,0660 0,2343 *** -2,8210 0,3238 *** -3,2254 0,3070 *** -4,9050 0,2353 *** -5,2991 0,2881 ***
included in the regressions
Specification LSpecification G Specification H Specification I Specification J Specification K
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Table 11 – Regressions: Less than 75% of the Bank Loan Obtained 
 
Notes:Variables presented in the table include: dummy for partial bank loan obtained (less than 75%); dummies for firm size (micro, small, medium-sized and large firms); dummies 
for age (less than two years, two to five years, five to nine years, more than nine years); dummies for sources of finance (use of retained earnings, trade credit and leasing, increase 
in equity); Bank Lending Survey index; GDP growth; inflation rate; unemployment rate; Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank concentration; coefficients for strength of the legal 
system, property rights protection, time to resolve a dispute, costs to settle a dispute and number of procedural steps. 




Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504 Number of obs 12504
LR chi2(21) 493,41 LR chi2(22) 570,43 LR chi2(22) 550,74 LR chi2(22) 575,39 LR chi2(22) 564,18 LR chi2(22) 542,05
Prob > chi2 0 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000 Prob > chi2 0,0000
Pseudo R2 0,0518 Pseudo R2 0,0599 Pseudo R2 0,0579 Pseudo R2 0,0604 Pseudo R2 0,0593 Pseudo R2 0,0569
Variable Code Description Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Micro Micro firms 0,0863 0,1066 0,0943 0,1068 0,0983 0,1069 0,1260 0,1070 0,1058 0,1069 0,0970 0,1069
Small Small firms 0,1272 0,0983 0,1317 0,0986 0,1398 0,0985 0,1712 0,0988 * 0,1538 0,0987 0,1459 0,0986
Medium Medium firms 0,0544 0,0978 0,0444 0,0981 0,0547 0,0980 0,0731 0,0982 0,0699 0,0981 0,0668 0,0981
<2 years Firms younger than 2 years 0,0588 0,1938 0,0990 0,1950 0,0289 0,1947 0,1149 0,1953 0,0933 0,1952 0,0485 0,1947
2 and 5 years Firms between 2 and 5 years of age 0,0485 0,1087 0,0251 0,1091 0,0243 0,1091 -0,0164 0,1097 0,0282 0,1091 0,0250 0,1090
5 and 9 years Firms between 5 and 9 years of age 0,1174 0,0829 0,0717 0,0836 0,0889 0,0833 0,0765 0,0836 0,0947 0,0833 0,1047 0,0831
Ret_earnings Use of retained earnings 0,0828 0,0585 0,1327 0,0588 ** 0,1191 0,0587 ** 0,0917 0,0585 0,1169 0,0586 ** 0,1033 0,0585 *
Trade_credit Use of trade credit 0,4900 0,0578 *** 0,4329 0,0581 *** 0,4441 0,0581 *** 0,4657 0,0581 *** 0,4095 0,0585 *** 0,4122 0,0587 ***
Leasing Use of leasing 0,0931 0,0580 0,1373 0,0584 ** 0,1379 0,0584 ** 0,1122 0,0582 * 0,1405 0,0584 ** 0,1279 0,0582 **
Equity Increase in equity 0,2726 0,1060 *** 0,3404 0,1067 *** 0,3338 0,1066 *** 0,3562 0,1067 *** 0,3044 0,1065 *** 0,3221 0,1066 ***
Semester Semester (wave of collection)
BLS Bank Lending Survey index 0,0132 0,0034 *** 0,0079 0,0033 ** 0,0146 0,0033 *** 0,0147 0,0033 *** 0,0196 0,0034 *** 0,0197 0,0034 ***
GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product -0,0754 0,0130 *** -0,0144 0,0152 -0,0161 0,0157 -0,0238 0,0145 -0,0025 0,0158 -0,0667 0,0133 ***
Inflation Inflation rate -0,0391 0,0308 -0,1509 0,0340 *** -0,1184 0,0329 *** -0,1029 0,0329 *** -0,1032 0,0319 *** -0,0387 0,0303
Unempl_overall Unemployment rate 0,0551 0,0048 *** 0,0653 0,0050 *** 0,0554 0,0049 *** 0,0242 0,0059 *** 0,0713 0,0053 *** 0,0696 0,0054 ***
HHI Herfindahl Index bank concentration -2,3563 0,6095 *** -1,2637 0,6330 ** -1,2182 0,6371 * -1,0587 0,5667 * -1,5302 0,6204 ** -1,2046 0,6247 *
Strength Strength of the legal system -0,1739 0,0197 ***
Pro_Protect Property rights protection -0,0198 0,0026 ***
N_procedures Number of procedural steps 0,0649 0,0074 ***
Time Time to resolve a dispute 0,0937 0,0001 ***
Cost_perc Costs for settling a dispute 0,0389 0,0056 ***
_cons Constant -2,9423 0,1432 0 -1,8562 0,1866 *** -1,3978 0,2462 *** -4,7185 0,2523 *** -3,6083 0,1675 *** -3,9966 0,2132 ***
included in the regressions
Specification RSpecification M Specification N Specification O Specification P Specification Q
58 
 
Table 12 – Change in the Coefficients for the Probability to be Granted the Entire or Part of the Loan 







All 1.1400 0.0150 1.0100 0.0010 0.9870 0.0040 0.9990 0.0001 0.9522 0.0030
>75 0.8566 0.0225 0.9852 0.0030 0.9727 0.0090 1.0010 0.0001 1.0490 0.0070
<75 0.8340 0.0160 0.9803 0.0020 1.0670 0.0077 1.0009 0.0001 1.0390 0.0050
IVs
























Table 13 – Economic Impact of Creditor Rights and Judicial Enforcement on the Probability to Obtain Credit 
Notes: The table reports the probability of obtaining credit in the country with the weakest and the strongest creditor rights and judicial enforcement system in our sample. Our 





Strength of the legal system (IT=3) (IE=9)
0,5870                               0,7589                               
Property rights protection (IT=50) (FI/NL/DE=90)
0,6026                               0,7172                               
Number of procedural steps (ES=41) (IE=21)
0,6459                               0,7024                               
Time to resolve a dispute (IT=1210) (FI=235)
0,5368                               0,7495                               
Costs for settling a dispute (IT=29.9) (FI=13.3)
0,5499                               0,7330                               
